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Many logical theories are incomplete, in the sense that non-trivial conclusions about
particular situations cannot be derived from them using classical deduction. In this
paper, we show how the ideas of interpolation and extrapolation, which are of crucial
importance in many numerical domains, can be applied in symbolic settings to alleviate
this issue in the case of propositional categorization rules. Our method is based on
(mainly) qualitative descriptions of how different properties are conceptually related,
where we identify conceptual relations between properties with spatial relations between
regions in Gärdenfors conceptual spaces. The approach is centred around the view that
categorization rules can often be seen as approximations of linear (or at least monotonic)
mappings between conceptual spaces. We use this assumption to justify that whenever
the antecedents of a number of rules stand in a relationship that is invariant under linear
(or monotonic) transformations, their consequents should also stand in that relationship.
A form of interpolative and extrapolative reasoning can then be obtained by applying this
idea to the relations of betweenness and parallelism respectively. After discussing these
ideas at the semantic level, we introduce a number of inference rules to characterize
interpolative and extrapolative reasoning at the syntactic level, and show their soundness
and completeness w.r.t. the proposed semantics. Finally, we show that the considered
inference problems are PSPACE-hard in general, while implementations in polynomial time
are possible under some relatively mild assumptions.
1. Introduction
Symbolic approaches to knowledge representation typically start from a finite set of natural language labels, which are
associated to atomic propositions (in propositional settings), to predicates (in first-order settings), or to atomic concepts (in
description logics). The meaning of these labels is then expressed implicitly by encoding how the corresponding propositions
are related to each other using a logical theory. Clearly, such a logical theory can only capture a small fraction of the actual
meaning of the labels at the cognitive level. Formalizing commonsense reasoning then boils down to developing principled
approaches to extend or refine logical inference, such that the conclusions that can be derived from a logical theory become,
in some way, closer to what we infer at the cognitive level. Some approaches to non-monotonic reasoning [1], for instance,
deal with exceptions by assuming that rules only apply to typical instances of the concepts involved or are only valid in
normal situations, even though these notions of typicality and normality are not explicitly expressed at the symbolic level.
Essentially, such approaches are non-monotonic because the factual knowledge they work on is incomplete: we may know
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that Tweety is a bird, but not that it is a penguin. Later observations may enrich our factual knowledge base, necessitating
a revision of some of the assumptions that were made (e.g. Tweety can fly). As another form of commonsense reasoning, in
this paper we look at techniques for dealing with a lack of generic knowledge. For the ease of presentation, we will assume
that generic knowledge is expressed as a set of propositional rules. We are then interested in situations where factual
knowledge is, in principle, complete, but where none of the given rules applies to the situation at hand. For instance, we
may know that it is advisable to rest (i) when feeling nauseated and having a high fever, and (ii) when feeling nauseated
without any fever, but not have any information about what is advisable in case of nausea with a mild fever.
Similarity-based reasoning Humans can often cope with such a lack of knowledge by drawing analogies, or by resorting to
knowledge about similar situations [2,3]. This observation has led to a number of theories of approximate reasoning, which
are mainly based on the premise that from similar conditions we can draw similar conclusions. Most notably, a large number
of fuzzy set based approaches have been proposed that build on the idea that the more a situation is compatible with the
fuzzy labels in the antecedent of a rule, the more it should be compatible with the fuzzy labels in its consequent. Such
rules, called gradual rules in [4], are based on a measure of similarity that is implicit in the definition of the membership
functions of the fuzzy labels. Related to gradual rules, certainty rules [4] rather encode that the more similar a situation is
to the fuzzy labels in the antecedent of a rule, the more certain that the consequent holds. Some related approaches avoid
the use of fuzzy sets and rather encode similarity assessments in an explicit way (e.g. [5–7]). Given that a1 and a→ b hold,
such methods allow to derive b with a certainty that depends on the degree of similarity sim(a,a1).
Despite the intuitive appeal of similarity-based approaches, and their popularity in the context of control and classi-
fication problems, they face a number of difficulties when used for commonsense reasoning. First, quantitative similarity
degrees can be hard to obtain in practice, a problem which is aggravated by the observation that similarity judgements are
context-dependent [8,9]. The quantitative nature of similarity degrees also makes it difficult to encode rules, e.g. exactly
how similar should a given premise a1 be to the antecedent of the rule a→ b to derive b with a given certainty? Finally,
similarity based methods tend to lack a principled way of dealing with conjunctions. For instance, assume that the rule
a∧ b→ c and the facts a1 and b1 are known to hold, and moreover sim(a,a1)= 0.6 and sim(b,b1)= 0.4. To assess whether
we can plausibly derive a1 ∧ b1 → c using similarity based reasoning, we would need to assess to what extent a1 ∧ b1 is
similar to a∧b. Usually, a truth-functional approach is assumed, assuming e.g. sim(a∧b,a1∧b1)=min(sim(a,a1), sim(b,b1))
or sim(a∧ b,a1 ∧ b1)= sim(a,a1) · sim(b,b1). Such views, however, are hard to justify from a cognitive point of view.
Betweenness The aforementioned shortcomings of similarity-based reasoning seem closely related to the use of degrees.
A key observation is that in practice, similarity-based approaches are often used to implement a form of interpolation
of symbolic rules: given the rules a1 → b1 and a3 → b3 , and a premise a2 which is known to be between a1 and a3 ,
a conclusion is obtained between b1 and b3 . Interpolative inference, however, can also be implemented in a qualitative
way, taking betweenness as primitive rather than similarity. Indeed, it suffices to know which propositions are conceptually
between a1 and a3 and which propositions are between b1 and b3 . For instance, since a mild fever is conceptually between
high fever and no fever, in the earlier example we conclude that resting is advised in case of nausea with a mild fever. This
basic form of interpolative inference can then be further refined, depending on the kind of background information that is
available about the conceptual relationships between the propositions (labels). For example, if we know that a2 is closer to
a1 than to a3 , we may insist that the conclusion should also be closer to b1 than to b3 . The idea of interpolating symbolic
knowledge can also be extended to various forms of extrapolative inference, as is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the following knowledge base, containing observations about the comfort level of different housing
options:
mansion→ exclusive (1)
villa∧ suburbs→ luxurious (2)
apartment ∧ suburbs→ basic (3)
apartment ∧ centre→ very-comfortable (4)
Clearly, this knowledge base is incomplete. For instance, we have no information at all about the comfort level of a villa in
the centre. However, from the rules that are provided, it seems reasonable to assume that villas are more comfortable than
apartments (by comparing (2) and (3)) and that housing in the centre is more comfortable than housing in the suburbs (by
comparing (3) and (4)). As a form of extrapolative inference, this leads us to conclude that a villa in the centre would at
least be as comfortable as a villa in the suburbs, i.e. either luxurious or exclusive. We may also wonder about apartments
in the outskirts of the city. As living in the outskirts is conceptually between living in the centre and living in the suburbs,
from (3) and (4) we may reasonably assume, as a form of interpolative inference, that the comfort level of an apartment in
the outskirts would be between basic and very-comfortable.
Objectives of the paper The aim of this paper is to develop a principled approach to interpolative and extrapolative reasoning,
as a general way to avoid the use of degrees when dealing with incomplete generic knowledge. In particular, we address
the following research questions:
1. How can interpolative and extrapolative inference be formalized? What are its computational properties and how can
automated inference procedures be implemented?
2. What is the nature of the background knowledge that is needed to support interpolative and extrapolative reasoning?
3. What is the semantic justification for interpolation and extrapolation? While most approaches to non-monotonic rea-
soning have a principled semantic foundation, typically based on the notion of preferred worlds [10,1] or the idea of
stable models [11,12], this is to a much lesser extent the case for current methods that deal with incompleteness of
rule bases.
The underlying idea is that among all possible refinements of a given knowledge base we favour those which are most
regular, an intuition which will be formalized using the theory of conceptual spaces [13]. This theory posits that natural
language labels can be identified with a convex region in a particular geometric space — called a conceptual space — whose
dimensions correspond to cognitively meaningful qualities. Using conceptual spaces, notions such as betweenness can be
given a clear geometric interpretation, which allows us to derive a semantic characterization of various interpolative and
extrapolative inference relations. It is important to note, however, that although conceptual spaces are crucial to justify our
approach, in practical applications, we do not actually require that the conceptual space representations of properties are
available. In particular, the inference mechanism itself will only require qualitative knowledge about how the conceptual
representations of labels are spatially related. For instance, to support a basic interpolative inference relation, it is only
required that we know which labels are conceptually between which other labels. Furthermore note that this form of
commonsense reasoning will actually be monotonic: increasing the rule base may allow us to refine earlier conclusions, but
will never violate them. In contrast, in the setting of non-monotonic reasoning, increasing the factual knowledge may lead
us to consider different rules to be applicable, as more specific rules may override more general ones.
Depending on the considered application, the required qualitative knowledge can be provided by an expert or it can be
derived automatically using data-driven techniques. In the first case, an expert may choose to manually encode some rules,
and rely on interpolation or extrapolation to avoid the need for a complete specification of the considered domain (e.g.
explicitly enumerating the comfort level for all housing types and all location types). The resulting inference relation would
be guaranteed to provide sound conclusions, although for those parts of the domain that were not explicitly modelled by
the expert, available information may be less precise (but not trivial). In the second case, where data-driven techniques are
used to obtain background information about the conceptual relationship of different labels (e.g. by analysing documents
from the web), the aim is rather to generate plausible conclusions from imperfect conceptual background knowledge. In this
way, we can combine the rigour of a logic-based framework with the flexibility of data-driven methods. The commonsense
aspect of the approach thus lies in the possibility to go beyond classical deduction by taking advantage of structural domain
knowledge that has been induced from data, without resorting to purely statistical techniques as in [14].
Organization The paper is structured as follows. After discussing related work in Section 2, we present a high-level overview
of our approach in Section 3. Section 4 subsequently discusses in more detail how qualitative spatial descriptions of con-
ceptual spaces can be used to encode the conceptual relationship of different atomic properties. Next, in Section 5 we
investigate how conceptual relations between atomic properties can be leveraged to conceptual relations between unions
and intersections of properties (represented as sets of vectors of properties), and how the latter conceptual relations can be
used to refine a given rule base at the semantic level. In Section 6 we then focus on the syntactic level: we introduce a set
of inference rules and show that they are sound and complete w.r.t. the semantics from Section 5. Section 7 analyses the
computational complexity of interpolative and extrapolative reasoning and presents an implementation method. In Section 8
we present some further thoughts on how to apply our method in practice, and in particular on the question of how to
handle inconsistencies that are introduced by our method. We present our conclusions and a number of directions for future
work in Section 9. Finally, note that this paper forms a substantially extended and revised version of [15]. Among others, we
now provide a complete characterization of extrapolative inference and include the idea of comparative distance (whereas
only the interpolative inference relation was characterized in [15]). We moreover present an implementation method, as
well as the proofs.
2. Related work
Our work is clearly related to existing approaches in cognition and knowledge representation that are based on a spatial
representation of knowledge. However, our approach also touches upon several other domains, including non-monotonic
reasoning, similarity-based reasoning, regularization in machine learning, and qualitative physics. We briefly clarify the
relationship with each of these domains.
Spatial representations of meaning
One of the central motivations of this paper is to approach commonsense reasoning by abandoning the idea that atomic
propositions are independent from each other, in favour of a view which allows them to be conceptually related in a way
that cannot be fully expressed at the logical level. Although atomic propositions are traditionally assumed to be independent,
several 20th century philosophers have argued against such a view. Wittgenstein [16] was among the first to realize that
sometimes we need more than a purely syntactic approach to logic, considering that atomic logical formulas may exclude
each other while they are not contradictory. A statement such as place P is green at time T and place P it is blue at time T is
treated as nonsensical by Wittgenstein rather than false, where he writes “It is, of course, a deficiency of our notation that it
does not prevent the formation of such nonsensical constructions, and a perfect notation will have to exclude such structures
by definite rules of syntax” [16]. In the same spirit, Carnap [17] uses the notion of an attribute space to group predicates
of the same type. An attribute space is an abstract representation of a certain domain. For instance, the attribute space
of colours consists of all (infinitely many) colour instances. In practice, these attribute spaces are usually described using
a finite set of labels, which correspond to predicates at the logical level. By thus partitioning the predicates into separate
attribute spaces, one can restrict interpretations to those that make exactly one predicate true from each attribute space,
for any given individual. Quine [18] uses the related notion of a quality space to characterize similarity, putting forward the
view that similarity cannot be defined in logical terms, and thus requires a deeper representation of atomic propositions.
These works have led to the more recent development of conceptual spaces [13] by Gärdenfors, in an attempt to use the
idea of a spatial representation of meaning to tackle problems in artificial intelligence (AI), among others. Conceptual spaces
will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Apart from the work on conceptual spaces, the idea of assuming a spatial representation to reason about concepts also
underlies [19], where an approach to integrate heterogeneous databases is proposed based on spatial relations between
concepts. This approach starts from the observation that types from one database may not have an exact counterpart in
another database. Conceptual relations between types are therefore considered which express e.g. that all typical instances
of type A belong to type B but some instances of type A may be outside B. Such relations can formally be modelled as
egg/yolk relations, which are a form of qualitative spatial relations between ill-defined spatial regions. Somewhat related, in
[20] we presented a general method for merging conflicting propositional knowledge bases coming from different sources,
based on the view that different sources may have a slightly different understanding of a given label. The different ways
in which such a label may be understood are encoded in terms of four primitive relations that essentially correspond
to qualitative spatial relations between (unknown) geometric representations of the labels. Although the kind of spatial
relations encountered in these existing works are mainly mereotopological, qualitative spatial reasoning about betweenness
is an active topic of research [21,22].
Non-monotonic reasoning
In general, several facets of commonsense reasoning have been extensively studied within the field of AI. Of particular
interest is the work on System P for reasoning about rules with exceptions [1]. In this approach, a non-monotonic conse-
quence relation is defined by encoding axiomatically how new rules may be derived from existing rules. In particular, the
non-monotonic consequence relation |∼ is defined by the following inference rules:
Reflexivity α|∼α
Left logical equivalence If α ≡ α′ and α|∼β then α′|∼β
Right weakening If β |H β ′ and α |∼ β then α|∼β ′
OR If α|∼γ and β|∼γ then α ∨ β|∼γ
Cautious monotony If α|∼β and α|∼γ then α ∧ β|∼γ
Cut If α ∧ β|∼γ and α|∼β then α|∼γ
where ≡ and |H denote equivalence and entailment in classical logic, respectively. Intuitively, α|∼β means that in normal
situations where α holds, it is also the case that β holds. The normative approach by System P about how a non-monotonic
consequence relation should behave has been very influential in the field of non-monotonic reasoning. While the purpose
of our paper is not to study non-monotonic consequence relations, our approach does resemble System P in that our goal is
also to produce new rules, which are appropriate to a given situation. However, whereas System P is concerned with finding
the most specific rules that are compatible with our (incomplete) knowledge about the situation at hand, in interpolative
and extrapolative reasoning there is no genuine issue of incompleteness at the factual level. Rather, we are interested in
situations where the given situation is not explicitly covered by a rule base, but is intermediate between, or analogous to
situations that are covered.
Similarity-based reasoning
Somewhat related, several authors have studied similarity-based consequence relations which are based on the intu-
ition that α approximately entails β iff every model of α is similar to some model of β [23,6,24]. In [25], for instance, a
similarity-based consequence relation is contrasted with the consequence relation from System P, revealing that similarity-
based reasoning satisfies monotonicity and most of the axioms of System P, but not the cut rule. More generally, a large
number of authors have proposed systems for approximate, similarity-based reasoning within the field of fuzzy set theory.
Most of these works are based on Zadeh’s generalized modus ponens [26] (but see [27] for an early example of a more
qualitative approach), which allows us to derive a fuzzy restriction on the value of variable Y from the knowledge that if
X is A then Y is B and X is A′ with A, A′ and B fuzzy sets. The basic idea is that the more A is similar to A′ , the more
the inferred restriction on Y will be close to B . When this idea is applied to a set of parallel rules, such that the fuzzy
sets in the antecedents of the rules overlap, it leads to a form of interpolative reasoning. Furthermore, several authors have
proposed methods to interpolate fuzzy rule bases in general, i.e. without requiring overlap of the fuzzy sets; we refer to
[28] for a recent overview. While these techniques are also about interpolating rules, they differ from our approach in a
number of ways. First, they are mostly restricted to uni-dimensional, numerical domains, and they require that quantitative
representations of symbolic labels be available in the form of fuzzy sets. Furthermore, they treat logical connectives, such
as conjunctions in the antecedent, in a truth-functional (and therefore heuristic) way.
In [29], a logic called CSL is introduced which has a construct A ⇔ B denoting all objects that are more similar to
instances of concept A than to instances of concept B . The qualitative nature of this logic brings it closer to the approach
we present in this paper. As it is based exclusively on closeness, and not on other aspects of spatial localization such as
being in between, CSL is not directly suitable as a basis for interpolative or extrapolative reasoning. Interestingly, however,
as a result of this restriction, CSL can be described using a preferential semantics [30].
Regularity
In the propositional setting, the idea of interpolation and extrapolation has been studied in [31], but from a rather
different angle. In particular, the paper discusses how the belief that certain propositions hold at certain moments in time
can be extended to beliefs about other moments in time, using persistence assumptions as a starting point. Nonetheless, as
in our paper, the main idea is to use general meta-principles to find those completion(s) of a knowledge base that are most
regular in some sense.
The idea of regularity can also be found in work on analogical proportions. An analogical proportion is an expression of
the form a : b :: c : d which reads as a is to b as c is to d. If a, b, c and d are binary propositions, this can be formalized
as (a → b ≡ c → d) ∧ (b → a ≡ d → c) (see [32]). In [33], an approach to classification is outlined which uses the view
that, as a form of regularity, the more of the condition attributes of three training items form an analogical proportion
with the condition attributes of the item to be classified, the more it becomes likely that also the decision attribute should
form an analogical proportion. Using connectives from multi-valued logic, analogical proportions can be defined for graded
propositions, which allows us to extend this idea to numerical attributes. In [34], an extrapolative inference mechanism has
been proposed which is based on such analogical proportions between graded proportions. The latter technique can be seen
as a special case of the approach we develop in this paper. In this paper, however, we also consider forms of interpolative
and extrapolative reasoning that are not based on analogical proportions, and the proposed techniques are moreover not
restricted to linearly ordered domains.
More generally, the idea of regularity appears in various forms in learning settings. In graph regularization [35], for in-
stance, the desire for regularity is even made explicit in the form of a graph which connects instances that should receive
a similar classification. In other approaches, the idea of regularity is implicit in the choice of the underlying classification
functions that are allowed (e.g. being restricted to hyperplanes in the case of support vector machines), and is thus imposed
to avoid overfitting. As an example of another domain where the idea of regularity surfaces, [36] presents an approach to
derive a preference ordering, starting from a set of generic preferences. To choose a specific ordering among all those sat-
isfying the constraints, the principle of minimal specificity from possibility theory is adopted as a way to avoid introducing
any irregularities that have not been explicitly specified as constraints.
The notion of matrix abduction, proposed in [37] is also related to our work in its use of regularity as a criterion to
complete missing values, although it operates at a lower-level representation. Specifically, consider a matrix whose rows
correspond to objects and whose columns correspond to binary features, such that exactly one entry of the matrix is ‘?’,
corresponding to a missing value, and all the other entries are 0 or 1. Then [37] proposes to choose the missing value such
that the regularity of the matrix is maximized. Specifically, a partial order relation is induced from both of the possible
completions of the matrix, and the completion which is favoured is the one whose associated partial order relation is most
natural in some sense. Note that, somewhat related, in abductive reasoning for causal diagnosis, it is also common to favour
the simplest explanations (e.g. preferring single fault diagnoses to explain observed symptoms).
Qualitative physics
Finally, there is some resemblance between the inference procedure presented in this paper and the early work on
qualitative reasoning about physical systems [38,39], which deals with monotonicity constraints such as “if the value of x
increases, then (all things being equal) the value of y decreases”. Our inference procedure differs from these approaches as
the domains we reason about do not need to be linearly ordered. Moreover, in the special case of linearly ordered domains,
we assume no prior information about which partial mappings are increasing and which are decreasing.
3. Overview of the approach
In this section, we introduce some notations and basic concepts that will be used throughout the paper. We also present
the main intuitions of our approach at an informal level.
Let A1, . . . , An be finite sets of labels, where each set Ai corresponds to a certain type of properties
1 (e.g. colours), and
the labels of Ai correspond to particular properties of the corresponding type (e.g. red, green, orange). The labels in Ai are
1 Throughout this paper, we use the terms concept and property interchangeably.
assumed to correspond to jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint (JEPD) properties. Note that each element (a1, . . . ,an)
from the Cartesian product A= A1 × · · · × An then corresponds to a maximally descriptive specification of the properties
that some object or situation may satisfy. We furthermore assume that Ai ∩ A j = ∅ for i 6= j. We will refer to the sets Ai as
attribute domains, and to their elements as attributes or, when used in a propositional language, as atoms.
We consider propositional rules of the form β → γ , where β and γ are propositional formulas, built in the usual way
from the set of atoms A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An and the connectives ∧ and ∨. Note that we do not need to explicitly consider nega-
tion, as the negation of an atom a ∈ Ai corresponds to the disjunction of the atoms in Ai \ {a}. We say that an element
(a1, . . . ,an) ∈A is a model of a formula (or a rule) α, written (a1, . . . ,an) |HA α if the corresponding propositional inter-
pretation {a1, . . . ,an} is a model of α in the usual sense, where we see propositional interpretations as sets containing all
atoms that are interpreted as true. For formulas (or rules or sets of rules) α1 and α2 , we say that α1 entails α2 , writ-
ten α1 |HA α2 if for every ω ∈A, ω |HA α1 implies ω |HA α2 . Note that the notion of entailment we consider is classical
entailment, modulo the assumption that the propositions in each set Ai are JEPD.
Example 2. Consider the following attribute domains:
A1 = {row-house1, semi-detached1,bungalow,villa,mansion,bedsit, studio,
one-bed-ap, two-bed-ap, three-bed-ap, loft,penthouse}
A2 = {row-house2, semi-detached2,detached,apartment}
A3 = {very-small, small,medium, large,very-large}
A4 = {basic, comfortable,very-comfortable, luxurious, exclusive}
where A1 lists the housing types that are possible in the given context, A2 provides a coarser description of some of these
housing types, and A3 and A4 contain the labels that are used to describe housing sizes and comfort levels respectively.
Note that subscripts are used for the housing options row-house and semi-detached to ensure that different attribute domains
are disjoint. When there is no cause for confusion, we will omit these subscripts. The following set of rules R provides a
partial specification of how these attribute domains are related to each other:
bungalow→medium bungalow→ detached (5)
mansion→ very-large mansion→ detached (6)
large∧ detached→ lux large∧ row-house→ comf (7)
small∧ detached→ bas∨ comf mansion→ excl (8)
where some labels are abbreviated for the ease of presentation. For example (villa,detached, large, lux) is a model of each of
these rules. Note that the only conclusions that can be derived from R are more or less trivial, e.g.
R |HA villa→ very-small∨ small∨medium∨ large∨ very-large (9)
R |HA (small∨ large)∧ detached→ basic∨ comfortable∨ luxurious (10)
Note that (9) follows from our assumption that the labels in an attribute domain are exhaustive.
3.1. Commonsense inference
A rule base R over the atoms in A usually only provides an incomplete specification of how the given attribute domains
are related to each other. We are interested in refining the available knowledge in R using a number of generic meta-
principles. To this end, we will make use of background knowledge about the conceptual relationship of different formulas,
which we assume to be encoded in a set of assertions Σ (to be formalized in Section 6). We are then interested in defining
a consequence relation ⊢ that extends the entailment relation |HA (i.e. supraclassicality). Specifically, we assume that the
following inference rule is valid:
R |HA β → γ
(R,Σ) ⊢ β → γ
(S)
The first meta-principle we consider is that intermediate conditions should lead to intermediate conclusions.
For instance, given that both large and small detached houses have a comfort level that is between basic and luxurious,
we derive that also medium detached houses should have a comfort level between these bounds. More generally, if a
propositional formula β is conceptually between the formulas β1 and β2 , the idea of interpolative inference is that whatever
we can derive from β should be conceptually between what we can derive from β1 and what we can derive from β2 . The
exact nature of this conceptual betweenness will be formalized in the following sections, but intuitively β is conceptually
Fig. 1. Modelling betweenness and parallelism between regions.
between β1 and β2 if β has all the features that β1 and β2 have in common. We could say, for instance, that a bistro is
conceptually between a bar and a restaurant, or that a studio is conceptually between a bedsit and an apartment. In ecology,
we may consider that taiga is between tundra and temperate-forest. We could take the view that the painting style of Renoir
is conceptually between the painting styles of Monet and Manet.
To encode information about betweenness at the syntactic level, we use a modality ✶, i.e. the formula β1 ✶ β2 is true
whenever a situation holds which is conceptually between a situation satisfying β1 and a situation satisfying β2 (or al-
ternatively, when talking about concepts, β1 ✶ β2 is true for instances that are between β1 and β2). Typically, it will not
be possible to have a precise definition of β1 ✶ β2 , as, in fact, our logical language may not be rich enough to precisely
capture exactly those situations. However, in practice, we may obtain knowledge about upper and lower approximations of
β1 ✶ β2 . We write Σ ⊢ γ → β1 ✶ β2 to denote that everything which satisfies γ is conceptually between β1 and β2 , and
Σ ⊢ β1 ✶ β2 → γ to denote that anything which is conceptually between β1 and β2 should definitely satisfy γ .
Example 3. It is not the case that all lofts are conceptually between a three-bedroom apartment and a penthouse (e.g. a
small loft with only one bedroom), so loft→ three-bed-ap✶ penthouse does not hold. However, we do have trivially that
three-bed-ap∨ penthouse→ three-bed-ap✶ penthouse
Conversely, however, some lofts are between a three-bedroom apartment and a penthouse, so we cannot remove the dis-
junct loft in the consequent of the following implication
three-bed-ap✶ penthouse→ three-bed-ap∨ loft ∨ penthouse
Note that in the considered domain, there are no apartments with more than three bedrooms (with the possible exception
of penthouses), hence three-bed-ap, loft and penthouse exhaustively cover all situations that are between a three-bedroom
apartment and a penthouse.
On the other hand, we may consider that all studios are between bedsits and one-bedroom apartments. Under this view,
we should be able to derive the following rules from Σ :
bedsit ∨ studio∨ one-bed-ap→ bedsit ✶ one-bed-ap
bedsit ✶ one-bed-ap→ bedsit ∨ studio∨ one-bed-ap
Using the binary modality ✶, we can define the following interpolative inference rule:
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
Σ ⊢ β∗→ β1 ✶ β2
Σ ⊢ γ1 ✶ γ2 → γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗→ γ ∗
(I)
A diagrammatic representation of this interpolation principle is shown in Fig. 1(a): given two rules β1 → γ1 and β2 → γ2 ,
we derive a rule which applies to a situation β∗ which is intermediate between β1 and β2 . The conclusion γ
∗ of that rule
is required to exhaustively cover all situations that are intermediate between γ1 and γ2 .
The second meta-principle states that analogous changes in the condition of a rule should lead to analogous changes in the conclu-
sion.
Let us write 〈β1, β2〉 to denote the change that is needed to convert a specification compatible with β1 into a specifi-
cation compatible with β2 . The intuition will be that 〈β1, β2〉 determines a direction-of-change. In contrast to betweenness,
this notion of direction is not symmetric, e.g. while 〈two-bed-ap, three-bed-ap〉 denotes the direction of an increasing num-
ber of bedrooms, 〈three-bed-ap, two-bed-ap〉 denotes a decreasing number. Given a third formula β3 , we are then interested
in those situations that can be obtained by changing a situation compatible with β3 in the direction specified by 〈β1, β2〉.
In particular, we will write β3 ✄ 〈β1, β2〉 for the formula that covers all such situations. For example, we could consider
that progressive rock differs from hard rock by having less standard song structures and arrangements, while keeping the
same instruments. Then heavy-metal ✄ 〈hard-rock,prog-rock〉 would cover all music genres that use heavy metal instruments
and timbres, but less standard song structures and arrangements. This would include all progressive metal, as well as some
instances of avant-garde metal, among others. In biology, we may consider that the difference between dog to coyote is
analogous to the difference between cat and leopard, or to the difference between cat and lynx, which we could encode as
coyote→ dog✄ 〈cat, leopard〉 and coyote→ dog✄ 〈cat, lynx〉 respectively. Note in particular that we do not take into account
the amount of change: while we may consider that the change from cat to leopard is bigger than the change from dog to
coyote, the direction of change is the same.
As for betweenness, we will mainly be interested in approximating β3 ✄ 〈β1, β2〉 rather than finding an exact definition,
i.e. we will be looking for propositional formulas that imply, and that are implied by β3 ✄ 〈β1, β2〉.
Example 4. The change from a bedsit to a studio essentially corresponds to an increase in size and comfort. In this sense,
such a change is similar to the change from a two-bedroom apartment to a three-bedroom apartment, or even to a pent-
house. We may consider, for instance:
Σ ⊢ two-bed-ap∨ three-bed-ap∨ penthouse→ two-bed-ap✄ 〈bedsit, studio〉
Σ ⊢ two-bed-ap✄ 〈bedsit, studio〉→ two-bed-ap∨ three-bed-ap∨ loft ∨ penthouse
Only the direction of the change is taken into account here, and not the amount of change. For instance, we might have
Σ ⊢ one-bed-ap∨ two-bed-ap∨ three-bed-ap∨ penthouse→ one-bed-ap✄ 〈one-bed-ap, two-bed-ap〉
Note that the meaning of 〈. , .〉 by itself cannot be expressed at the syntactic level, i.e. .✄ 〈. , .〉 is treated as a ternary
modality. Extrapolative inference can then be formalized as follows:
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
(R,Σ) ⊢ β3 → γ3
Σ ⊢ β∗→ β1 ✄ 〈β2, β3〉
Σ ⊢ γ1 ✄ 〈γ2,γ3〉→ γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗→ γ ∗
(E)
A diagrammatic representation is given in Fig. 1(b). In this case, three rules β1 → γ1 , β2 → γ2 and β3 → γ3 are available,
and we are interested in deriving conclusions about a fourth situation β∗ which differs from β1 as β3 differs from β2 . The
conclusion γ ∗ which is derived exhaustively covers all situations that differ from γ1 as γ3 differs from γ2 .
Finally, we assume that the consequence relation ⊢ is deductively closed:
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
{β1 → γ1, β2 → γ2} |HA β3 → γ3
(R,Σ) ⊢ β3 → γ3
(D)
Example 5. Consider the rules from Example 2. Applying (S), we immediately have
(R,Σ) ⊢ bungalow→medium (R,Σ) ⊢mansion→ very-large
Assuming
Σ ⊢ bungalow∨ villa∨mansion→ bungalow✶mansion
Σ ⊢medium✶ very-large→medium∨ large∨ very-large
we find using (I) that
(R,Σ) ⊢ bungalow∨ villa∨mansion→medium∨ large∨ very-large
and using (D) that (R,Σ) ⊢ villa→ medium ∨ large ∨ very-large which refines the trivial conclusion that we obtained in
Example 2. Similarly, we find using (S) that
(R,Σ) ⊢ large∧ detached→ lux
(R,Σ) ⊢ large∧ row-house→ comf
(R,Σ) ⊢ small∧ detached→ bas∨ comf
If we now assume that (writing det for detached)
Σ ⊢ (large∨medium∨ small∨ very-small)∧ row-house→ (large∧ row-house)✄ 〈large∧ det, small∧ det〉
Σ ⊢ comf ✄ 〈lux,bas∨ comf 〉→ bas∨ comf
then (E) yields
(R,Σ) ⊢ (large∨medium∨ small∨ very-small)∧ row-house→ bas∨ comf (11)
from which we obtain using (D) that (R,Σ) ⊢medium∧ row-house→ bas∨ comf . Indeed, the rule in (11) plays the role of
β1 → γ1 from the definition of (D), whereas the rule β2 → γ2 is trivial.
At this point it may not be clear whether the inference relation defined by (S), (I), (E) and (D) always behaves according
to intuition, nor what the implications are at the semantic level of adopting (I) and (E). To this end, in the following
sections, we will develop a semantic counterpart of the inference relation ⊢, which will clarify the nature of the modalities
✶ and ✄〈,〉 and will allow us to implement decision procedures for reasoning tasks of interest. A crucial issue that will be
discussed in detail is the interaction between the aforementioned modalities on the one hand, and logical conjunction on
the other hand, e.g. discussing under which conditions (α1 ∧ β1)✶ (α2 ∧ β2) is equivalent to (α1 ✶ α2)∧ (β1 ✶ β2).
The principles (I) and (E) allow us to refine a rule base R by exploiting background knowledge about the conceptual
relationship of labels from the same attribute domain. This background knowledge is of a qualitative nature. Extrapolative
reasoning, for instance, is based on the idea of direction of change, but does not take the amount of change into account.
An analogical proportion such as a : b :: c : d, on the other hand, not only expresses that the change from a to b goes in
the same direction as the change from c to d, but also that the amount of change between a and b is the same as the
amount of change between c and d [40]. To take information about the amount of change into account, and thus generalize
analogical reasoning — making it also more cautious when necessary — we will use expressions such as β1 ✄[λ,µ] 〈β2, β3〉
where 0 6 λ 6 µ < +∞. Intuitively, this formula covers all situations that can be obtained by changing β1 in the same
direction as the change from β2 to β3 , such that the amount of change is between λ and µ times as large as the amount of
change between β2 and β3 . This allows us to make inferences which are more precise in cases where suitable information
about the amount of change is available. For example, knowing that the amount of change between dog and coyote is
approximately the same as the amount of change between cat and lynx, the latter relationship is more useful than the
relationship between cat and leopard if we want to derive knowledge about coyotes from knowledge about dogs.
The most straightforward use of this generalization is to express whether the amount of change from β1 should be
smaller, equal, or larger than the amount of change from β2 to β3 . In particular, β1✄[1,1] 〈β2, β3〉 corresponds to the solution
X that makes β1 : X :: β2 : β3 a perfect analogical proportion, while β1✄[0,1[ 〈β2, β3〉 and β1✄]1,+∞[ 〈β2, β3〉 express amounts
of change that are smaller and larger, respectively, than the amount of change from β2 to β3 . Note that β1 ✄[0,+∞[ 〈β2, β3〉
corresponds to β1 ✄ 〈β2, β3〉. Also note that in the aforementioned cases, the approach remains entirely qualitative. Other
choices for the intervals [λ,µ] may give the approach a more numerical flavour, and would mainly be useful in scenarios
where the conceptual relationships are obtained using data-driven techniques.
For τ a non-empty subset of [0,+∞[, Principle (E) can be refined to
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
(R,Σ) ⊢ β3 → γ3
Σ ⊢ β∗→ β1 ✄τ 〈β2, β3〉
Σ ⊢ γ1 ✄τ 〈γ2,γ3〉→ γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗→ γ ∗
(E’)
Along similar lines, for σ a non-empty subset of [0,1], we consider expressions of the form β1 ✶σ β2 to put constraints on
the relative closeness to β1 and β2 . Specifically, β1 ✶[0,0.5[ β2 corresponds to those situations between β1 and β2 that
are closer to β1 than to β2 . Note that β1 ✶[0,0.5[ β2 is a refinement of the construct β1 ⇔ β2 from CSL [29], as be-
tweenness is not required in CSL, only comparative closeness. Similarly, β1 ✶]0.5,1] β2 corresponds to situations that are
closer to β2 than to β1 , and β1 ✶[0.5,0.5] β2 to situations that are exactly halfway. When data-driven techniques are used,
other intervals may again be useful. In scenarios where labels can be assumed to be equidistant, we may also know e.g.
that small→ very-small ✶[0.25,0.25] very-large and large→ very-small ✶[0.75,0.75] very-large, where the idea is that medium is
halfway between very-small and very-large and small is halfway between very-small and medium.
Principle (I) can be refined to
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
Σ ⊢ β∗→ β1 ✶σ β2
Σ ⊢ γ1 ✶σ γ2 → γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗→ γ ∗
(I’)
Example 6. Consider again the setting of Example 5, and assume that a villa is conceptually halfway between a bungalow
and a mansion, and that a large house is conceptually halfway between a medium house and a very-large house. We then
get
Σ ⊢ villa→ bungalow✶[0.5,0.5] mansion (12)
Σ ⊢medium✶[0.5,0.5] very-large→ large (13)
which allows us the obtain the refined conclusion (R,Σ) ⊢ villa→ large using (I’) and (D). Alternatively, we could assume
that a villa is conceptually closer to a bungalow than to a mansion, by assuming that
Σ ⊢ bungalow∨ villa→ bungalow✶[0,0.5[ mansion
Together with
Σ ⊢medium✶[0,0.5[ very-large→medium∨ large
we would then find R ⊢ villa→medium∨ large.
3.2. Mappings between attribute domains
At the semantic level, a rule base R can be seen as a mapping between sets of vectors of attributes. In particular, assume
that all the labels in the antecedents of the rules in R belong to the attribute domains B1, . . . , Bs and that the labels in
the consequents belong to C1, . . . ,Ck . The rule base R can then equivalently be expressed as a function fR from subsets of
B = B1 × · · · × Bs to subsets of C = C1 × · · · × Ck , defined for X ⊆ B as
fR(X)=
⋂{
Y ∈ 2C
∣∣∣ R |HA ( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
k∧
i=1
yi
)}
where A = A1 × · · · × An and {A1, . . . , An} = {B1, . . . , Bs} ∪ {C1, . . . ,Ck} as before. It is not hard to see that this function
indeed expresses the same knowledge as the rule base R . Furthermore, there exists a single Y ∗ ∈ 2C such that fR(X)= Y
∗
and
R |HA
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∗
k∧
i=1
yi
)
Example 7. Consider again the rules base from Example 2. We have that B = A1 × A2 × A3 , as no rule refers to comfort
levels in its antecedent, and C = A2× A3× A4 , as only the coarser housing types of A2 are referred to in the consequent of
rules. We find that a small detached villa is either basic or comfortable:
fR
({
(villa,det, small)
})
=
{
(det, small,bas), (det, small, comf )
}
Indeed, from
small∧ detached→ bas∨ comf
It follows that
small∧ detached∧ villa→ (bas∨ comf )∧ small∧ detached
from which we can already conclude
fR
({
(villa,det, small)
})
⊆
{
(det, small,bas), (det, small, comf )
}
It is furthermore clear that there are no rules in R which could be used to further refine f R({(villa,det, small)}).
Similarly, we find that a bungalow is detached and medium-sized, while we find no restrictions on the possible comfort
levels:
fR
({
(bun, x, y)
∣∣, x ∈ A2, y ∈ A3})= {(det,medium, z) ∣∣ z ∈ A4}
We may see fR as an approximate (i.e. incomplete) model of a given domain, which may be refined as soon as new
information becomes available. In particular, for two 2B → 2C functions f and f ′ which are monotone w.r.t. set inclusion,
we say that f is a refinement of f ′ , written f 6 f ′ , iff
∀X ⊆ B. f (X)⊆ f ′(X) (14)
This idea of using monotone set-valued functions to describe approximate models is closely linked to the theory of Scott
domains; see e.g. [41] for an elaboration of this idea. At the semantic level, completing the rule base R boils down to refin-
ing the corresponding function fR . In our approach, such refinements will be based on meta-knowledge about the nature
of the relationship between B and C . This will lead us to replace fR by the largest refinement, w.r.t. 6, which is compatible
with the imposed meta-knowledge. In particular, as will become clear below, Principles (I) and (E) amount to refine fR by
imposing some form of monotonicity, whereas (I’) and (E’) amount to refine fR by imposing a form of linearity. As could be
expected, the meta-knowledge underlying (I’) and (E’) is stronger than the meta-knowledge underlying (I) and (E).
4. Formalization using conceptual spaces
The approach sketched in Section 3 requires information about how the labels of an attribute domain are conceptually
related to each other. Provided that this information is available, inference can be carried out purely at the symbolic level.
However, to justify the inference procedure, and to provide an adequate semantics for it, we need to be precise on how
relationships such as betweenness should be interpreted. To this end, we assume that the cognitive meaning of the attributes
can be represented geometrically, as convex regions in a conceptual space. Conceptual relationships can then be given a clear
spatial interpretation, as will be discussed in Section 4.1. Taking advantage of this link with conceptual spaces, Section 4.2
subsequently reviews some opportunities for the acquisition of conceptual relations. Finally, Section 4.3 presents the idea of
regular mappings between conceptual spaces as a basis for interpolative and extrapolative reasoning.
4.1. Geometric modelling of attribute domains
The theory of conceptual spaces [13] is centred around the assumption that the meaning of a natural property can
be adequately modelled as a convex region in some geometric space. Formally, a conceptual space is the Cartesian product
Q 1×· · ·×Qm of quality dimensions, each of which corresponds to an atomic, cognitively meaningful feature, called a quality.
A standard example is the conceptual space of colours, which can be described using the quality dimensions hue, saturation
and intensity. Labels to describe colours, in some natural language, are then posited to correspond to convex regions in this
conceptual space, a view which is closely related to the ideas of prototype theory [42]. The label red for instance will be
represented by the set of points whose hue is in the spectrum normally associated with red, whose saturation is sufficiently
high, and whose intensity is neither too high nor too low. Note that while e.g. red may be an atomic property at the
symbolic level, at the cognitive level it is defined in terms of more primitive notions. Quality dimensions may be continuous
or discrete, and can even be finite. In practice, however, it is common to identify conceptual spaces with Euclidean spaces
[42], and to define cognitive similarity in terms of Euclidean distance. We will also adopt this simplifying view throughout
the paper, although part of the discussion readily generalizes to more general spaces.2
Now consider again the example of housing types. A conceptual space to represent housing types would have a large
number of dimensions, relating to shape, size, colour, texture, etc. Each house that exists in the world will correspond to
one specific point in this conceptual space. Conversely, however, there may be points in that conceptual space which do not
correspond to structures that can be physically realized, or that would not be recognized as houses (e.g. a building structure
of 20 km long and 1 cm wide). Each attribute from the domain A1 corresponds to a convex region in the conceptual space,
where intuitively, e.g. the region corresponding to villa corresponds to those building structures that are more similar to
prototypical villas than to prototypical instances of the other attributes in A1 .
In general, each attribute domain Ai thus corresponds to a partition of some conceptual space in convex regions, where
each attribute of Ai corresponds to a partition class. As some regions of conceptual spaces may correspond to types of
instances that do not exist in the real world, the number of partition classes may, in principle be higher than the number
of attributes in Ai . We write reg(x) to denote the convex region that corresponds to label x. For example, reg(three-bed-ap)
represents all sections of building structures that could be classified as three-bedroom apartments. This set will contain
both points that correspond to actual apartments (which exist somewhere in the world) and possible apartments (which
may in principle be built one day).
This conceptual space representation of the attributes is considerably richer than what can be described at the symbolic
level, and therefore also allows for richer forms of inference. However, in most application domains, it is not reasonable
to assume that such representations are available. Moreover, the precise representation of a property in a conceptual space
strongly depends on the considered context and may be subjective. Usually, however, it is assumed that a particular concep-
tual space representation can be obtained from a generic representation by appropriately rescaling the quality dimensions
2 In particular, interpolative reasoning can be carried out w.r.t. any space for which betweenness can meaningfully be defined. See e.g. [43] for a formal-
ization of conceptual spaces in terms of a primitive betweenness relation.
Fig. 2. Modelling betweenness and parallelism between regions.
[44]. Note that this observation implies that also similarity judgements may differ across contexts and people, as rescaling
the dimensions may influence the relative Euclidean distance between points. For instance, while apples are usually consid-
ered to be closer to tomatoes than to chocolate, in the context of desserts, they may be closer to chocolate (e.g. because both
can be used in cakes). To alleviate these issues, we will rely on (mainly) qualitative knowledge about the spatial relation-
ship of different properties. Such qualitative knowledge may be easier to obtain, and because the spatial relations that will
be considered are invariant under affine transformations (such as rescaling the quality dimensions), they are more robust
against changes in context and person. In particular, such relations are not affected by rescaling of the quality dimensions,
although they would still depend on context changes that introduce additional quality dimensions.
For each attribute domain Ai , we assume that information is available about betweenness and parallelism of the concep-
tual space representation of its attributes. For example, we may intuitively think of a studio to be between a bedsit and a
one-bedroom apartment. In the domain of music genres, we may consider that the change from hard-rock to progressive-rock
is parallel to the change from heavy-metal to progressive-metal, and that progressive-rock is between hard-rock and avant-
garde. The notions of betweenness and parallelism are straightforwardly defined for points in Euclidean spaces. In particular,
let us write bet(p,q, r) to denote that q lies between p and r (on the same line), and par(p,q, r, s) to denote that the vec-
tors
−→
pq and
−→
rs point in the same direction. The fact that point q is between points p and r means that for every point x it
holds that d(q, x)6max(d(p, x),d(r, x)), and in particular, that whenever p and r are close to a prototype of some concept,
then q is close to it as well. In this sense, we may see bet(p,q, r) as a way to express that whatever natural properties p
and r have in common, p and q have them in common as well (identifying points in a conceptual space with instances). On
the other hand, par(p,q, r, s) intuitively means that to arrive at s, r needs to be changed in the same way as p needs to be
changed to arrive at q, i.e. at the qualitative level, p is to q as r is to s (although the amount of change may be different).
The notions of betweenness and parallelism, which are defined for points, need to be extended to regions, in order to
describe relationships between attributes. As is well known, this can be done in different ways [45]. We will consider the
following two notions of betweenness for regions A, B , and C (in a given Euclidean space):
bet(A, B,C) iff ∃q ∈ B.∃p ∈ A.∃r ∈ C .bet(p,q, r) (15)
bet(A, B,C) iff ∀q ∈ B.∃p ∈ A.∃r ∈ C .bet(p,q, r) (16)
In particular, if A and C are convex regions, bet(A, B,C) holds if B overlaps with the convex hull of A ∪ C , whereas
bet(A, B,C) holds if B is included in this convex hull. These two notions of betweenness are illustrated in Fig. 2(a), where
bet(A, B1,C), bet(A, B1,C) and bet(A, B2,C) hold, but not bet(A, B2,C). Note in particular that both relations are reflex-
ive w.r.t. the first two arguments, in the sense that e.g. bet(A, A,C) holds, as well as symmetric, in the sense that e.g.
bet(A, B,C)≡ bet(C, B, A). However, transitivity does not necessarily hold for regions, e.g. from bet(A, B,C) and bet(B,C, D)
we cannot infer that bet(A, B, D); a counterexample is depicted in Fig. 3(a).3 In the terminology of rough set theory [46],
bet and bet correspond to upper and lower approximations of betweenness. The underlying idea is that, given our finite set
of labels, we may not be able to exactly describe the convex hull of two regions A and B . All we can do, then, is to list
all labels which are completely included in the convex hull (i.e. define the lower approximation of the convex hull), and
all labels which have a non-empty intersection with the convex hull (i.e. define the upper approximation of the convex
hull). In the following, for the ease of presentation we will often identify labels with the corresponding regions, writing e.g.
bet(a,b, c) for bet(reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)).
Example 8. In the domain of housing types, we may consider that we have bet(three-bed-ap, loft,penthouse) but not
bet(three-bed-ap, loft,penthouse). Note that this corresponds to what was expressed at the syntactic level in Example 3.
3 This counterexample also illustrates a technical subtlety of the considered framework. If we want to represent the meaning of each label as a topolog-
ically closed set, then regions will inevitably share their boundary with other regions, which is not compatible with the view that different labels (of the
same attribute domain) refer to pairwise disjoint properties. One solution to this problem is to associate with each label a topologically open region, and
introduce topologically closed regions that correspond to borderline instances, i.e. instances for which it is hard to tell whether they belong to one concept
or to another. In Fig. 3(a), nothing prevents us from taking B and C to be topologically open regions.
Fig. 3. The relations bet and par are not transitive.
For regions A, B , C and D (in a given Euclidean space), two notions of parallelism will be considered:
par(A, B,C; D) iff ∃s ∈ D.∃p ∈ A, ∃q ∈ B, ∃r ∈ C .∃λ> 0.
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq
par(A, B,C; D) iff ∀s ∈ D.∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B,∃r ∈ C .∃λ> 0.
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq
For parallelism, the role of the convex hull is replaced by a notion of conical extension, which is illustrated in Fig. 2(b). In
particular, if par(A, B,C; D) holds, some point in D differs from some point in C in the same direction that some point in B
differs from some point in A. In the scenario of Fig. 2(b), this means that D overlaps with the shaded area. Likewise, when
par(A, B,C; D) holds, D is included in the shaded area of Fig. 2(b). For all regions A, B and C , we have that par(A, B,C;C)
holds (and thus also par(A, B,C;C)), as well as par(A, B, A; B). However, as for betweenness, transitivity does not hold, as
is illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
Example 9. We may consider that the following relations hold (cf. Example 4)
par(bedsit, studio, two-bed-ap; loft)
par(bedsit, studio, two-bed-ap; three-bed-ap)
In other words, for every point s in reg(three-bed) we can find points p ∈ reg(bedsit), q ∈ reg(studio) and r ∈ reg(two-bed-ap)
such that
−→
pq is parallel to
−→
rs. In other words, every three-bedroom apartment differs from some two-bedroom apartment in
(qualitatively) the same way as some studio differs from some bedsit. Similarly, we have that some (but not all) lofts differ
from some two-bedroom apartment in the same way that some studio differs from some bedsit.
As a refinement of bet(p,q, r), we may put constraints on the distance ratio
d(p,q)
d(p,r)
, where d denotes the Euclidean
distance. Note that distance ratios for points on the same line are preserved under affine transformations. In particular, for
σ a subset of [0,1], we consider the following relations:
betσ (A, B,C) iff ∃q ∈ B.∃p ∈ A.∃r ∈ C .bet(p,q, r)∧
(
∃λ ∈ σ .d(p,q)= λ · d(p, r)
)
(17)
betσ (A, B,C) iff ∀q ∈ B.∃p ∈ A.∃r ∈ C .bet(p,q, r)∧
(
∃λ ∈ σ .d(p,q)= λ · d(p, r)
)
(18)
Clearly, bet = bet[0,1] and bet = bet[0,1] . Other notable cases are σ = [0.5,0.5], when (17)–(18) express that B is halfway
between A and C , σ =]0.5,1], when (17)–(18) express that B is closer to C than to A, and σ = [0,0.5[, when (17)–(18)
express that B is closer to A than to C . Note that we can only have bet[0,0](reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) if a= b since labels from
the same attribute domain are assumed to be disjoint. A similar refinement of parallelism is possible, where for τ a subset
of [0,+∞[, we define
parτ (A, B,C; D) iff ∃s ∈ D.∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B,∃r ∈ C .∃λ ∈ τ .
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq (19)
parτ (A, B,C; D) iff ∀s ∈ D.∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B,∃r ∈ C .∃λ ∈ τ .
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq (20)
In the particular case where τ = [1,1], (19)–(20) extend the idea of a parallelogram, whose relationship to the idea of
analogical proportion is well known.
4.2. Acquiring conceptual relations
Regarding the applicability of our approach, an important question is how the required relational knowledge about
conceptual spaces can be obtained, e.g. how do we find out that a studio is conceptually between a bedsit and a one-bedroom
apartment? Depending on the specific application, different options may be available.
Fig. 4. Qualitative description of a conceptual space of housing types.
Manual encoding
In some domains, it is feasible to manually encode a complete qualitative description of a conceptual space. Most notably,
this is the case for conceptual spaces that are uni-dimensional, for which it suffices to provide a ranking of the labels of
interest. For instance, a conceptual space of housing sizes may be described by encoding that
very-small < small < medium < large < very-large
From this description, we immediately obtain that, for example, the relations bet(very-small,medium, large) and
par(very-small, small,medium;very-large) hold. Note that in uni-dimensional domains, the relations bet and bet coincide
when applied to labels of the same attribute domain (as these correspond to disjoint intervals), as do the relations par
and par. In multi-dimensional domains, it may still be the case that providing a qualitative description is mainly a matter
of ranking. The qualitative description of such simple multi-dimensional conceptual spaces can easily be modelled using a
diagram. Fig. 4 provides an example of such a diagram, where lines define tuples that satisfy bet and parallel lines define
tuples that satisfy par. For example, in the case of Fig. 4, we have that
par(2-bed-ap,3-bed-ap,2-bed-rowhouse;3-bed-rowhouse)
As the formalization of such diagrams is straightforward, we will not discuss it in detail. However, it should be clear that
a diagrammatic representation can only be obtained when some simplifying conditions are met. For example, in Fig. 4, it
is tacitly assumed that bet = bet and par = par, and moreover that many transitivity and mixed transitivity properties are
assumed for bet and par that do not hold in general (e.g. bet(a,b, c)∧ par(b, c,d; e)⇒ par(a, c,d; e)). While such diagrams
can therefore not account for the full generality offered by the relations bet , bet , par and par, in simple domains, as the
housing example of Fig. 4, they offer a convenient way of modelling our intuitions about the conceptual relationships that
hold.
Natural language processing
A second possibility is to extract conceptual relations from natural language. In [47], for instance, the idea of latent
relational analysis was introduced, with the aim of identifying analogical proportions. As instances of par[1,1] correspond to
analogical proportions, conceptual relations of this particular type can be obtained in the same way. The main idea is that
two pairs of words are likely to be related analogously, i.e. form an analogical proportion, when the lexical contexts in which
they co-occur are similar. For example, the words kitten and cat are found in sentences such as “a kitten is a young cat”,
while the words chick and chicken are found in sentences such as “a chick is a young chicken”. From such observations, the
analogical proportion kitten : cat :: chick : chicken can be discovered. Another technique for discovering analogical proportions
from the web was proposed in [48], estimating the strength of analogical proportions by converting co-occurrence statistics
using Kolmogorov information theory. Instances of bet[0.5,0.5](a,b, c) could be identified with analogical proportions of the
form a : b :: b : c. In principle, instances of bet and bet can be discovered by applying general methods for extracting ternary
relations from text [49]. However, it is clear that the use of information extraction techniques to define the relations bet,
bet, par and par will necessarily by highly heuristic, due to the inherent imperfection of such methods.
Data-driven techniques
If sufficient information is available about instances of concepts or properties, several data-driven approaches can be
used, which directly take advantage of the geometric nature of the relations of interest. For instance, [42] suggests to
start from pairwise similarity judgements between instances, and use multi-dimensional scaling to obtain coordinates for
them in a Euclidean space. Representations of concepts can then be obtained by determining the corresponding Voronoi
tessellation, after which the conceptual relations of interest can be evaluated by straightforward geometric calculations.
The number of dimensions of the resulting space can be freely chosen, where fewer dimensions lead to more conceptual
relationships, as only the most prominent dimensions of the conceptual space are then taken into account. Thus, the lower
the number of dimensions, the less cautious the resulting inference mechanism will be. In [50], the feasibility of such an
approach was demonstrated in the domain of music genres, using similarity judgements that were obtained indirectly using
user-contributed meta-data from the website last.fm.4
Rather than starting from similarity judgements, [14] suggests an approach based on singular value decomposition (SVD),
which is a form of dimensionality reduction. Translated to our setting, the approach would start from a matrix where rows
correspond to instances and columns correspond to binary features that these instances may or may not have. Instances
are then represented in a high-dimensional space with one dimension for each feature, and coordinates are either 0 or 1,
depending on whether the instance has the corresponding feature. Using SVD, a linear transformation is then determined
which maps this high-dimensional space onto a space of lower dimension, with real-valued coordinates. As before, the
resulting representations of the instance can be used to generate geometric representations of the concepts. Again we have
that the chosen number of dimensions determines to what extent all quality dimensions, or only the most prominent ones
are taken into account. Note that this latter approach offers an interesting connection between representations of concepts as
sets of features and geometric representations, which also allows us to make the relationship between analogical proportions
and parallelism explicit. In particular, assume that the analogical proportion a : b :: c : d holds for the instances a, b, c and
d, and let their sets of features be denoted by A, B , C and D respectively. According to the formal definition of analogical
proportion [40,32], we have that A \ B = C \D and B \ A = D \C (where we write \ for set difference). From this observation,
it is easy to see that the representations of a, b, c and d form a parallelogram in the initial, high-dimensional {0,1}-valued
space. Since, parallelograms are preserved under linear transformations, a, b, c and d will still form a parallelogram in the
resulting conceptual spaces representation. Note that in principle, due to the lower number of dimensions, the conceptual
space may contain more quadruples of instances that form a parallelogram than the initial space. These parallelograms
intuitively correspond to pairs of instances that are analogical in all relevant aspects.
Alternatively, the SVD approach can also be applied when feature representations of concepts, rather than instances, are
available. The concepts are then represented as points, and betweenness and parallelism of these points may be taken to be
indicative of betweenness and parallelism of the unknown representations of the concepts as regions.
Example 10. Consider a rule base about red wines. From a web page about red wines5 we learn the following knowledge
beaujolais→ low-tan∧ light-body
inexpensive∧ burgundy→ low-tan∧ light-body
bardolino→ low-tan∧ light-body
valpolicella→ low-tan∧ light-body
inexpensive∧ bordeaux→ low-tan∧med-body
chianti→ low-tan∧med-body
rioja→ low-tan∧med-body
merlot→ (low-tan∨mid-tan)∧med-body
mid-range∧ burgundy→ low-tan∧med-body
inexpensive∧ cabernet-sauvignon→ low-tan∧med-body
mid-range∧ bordeaux→mid-tan∧med-body
above-average∧ cabernet-sauvignon→mid-tan∧med-body
zinfandel→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)∧ (med-body∨ full-body)
shiraz→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)∧ (med-body∨ full-body)
high-end∧ bordeaux→ high-tan∧ full-body
high-end∧ burgundy→ high-tan∧ full-body
high-end∧ cabernet-sauvignon→ high-tan∧ full-body
barolo→ high-tan∧ full-body
barbaresco→ high-tan∧ full-body
4 http://www.last.fm.
5 http://randomnetstuff.com/wineplace/redwine.php, accessed July 28th, 2011.
brunello-di-montalcino→ high-tan∧ full-body
low-tan∧ light-body→ light-red
low-tan∧med-body→med-red
mid-tan∧med-body→ dark-red∨ opaque
high-tan∧ full-body→ opaque
Given the large number of wine types that exist, inevitably some types are not contained in this rule base. Let us consider,
as an example, the wines Barbera and Bandol. From another web page about wine,6 we extract information about wine–food
pairings. For each listed wine type, we create a vector with one component for every listed food type. This component is set
to 1 if the wine is mentioned as appropriate for the corresponding food type, and to 0 otherwise. Assuming that wine–food
pairings are based on the taste of the wine, they may provide a valuable source of information about how different wines
are related to each other. Using the SVD technique, we reduce the dimension of these vectors to a specified (typically
somewhat arbitrary) number of abstract dimensions; in this example, we take 5 dimensions. As every wine type is then
represented as a point in a 5-dimensional space, we can calculate which wines are between which other ones. In particular,
if the cosine of the angle between
−→
ab and
−→
ac is sufficiently close to 1, for a, b and c the vector representations of three
wine types a, b and c, and if ‖
−→
ab‖< ‖
−→
ac‖, we assume that the taste of wine b is between that of wines a and c. Similarly, if
the cosine of the angle between
−→
ab and
−→
cd is sufficiently close to 1, we assume that the change from wine a to wine b goes
in the same direction as the change from wine c to wine d. In this way, we obtained that Barbera is between Chianti and
Merlot (requiring the cosine to be at least 0.975). Given that these latter two wines, have either low or medium tannins, we
can derive using interpolative inference that the same should hold for Barbera. Bandol, on the other hand, is not found to
be between any two other types of wine. However, we do find that the following pairs 〈(a,b), (c,d)〉 correspond to parallel
changes in wine type (again requiring the cosine to be at least 0.975):〈
(bandol, cabernet-sauvignon), (bordeaux,barolo)
〉〈
(bandol, zinfandel), (barolo,barbera)
〉〈
(bandol, zinfandel), (bordeaux,barbera)
〉
Given that the change from both Barolo and Bordeaux to Barbera is towards lower tannins, using extrapolative reasoning
we derive that the amount of tannins in Bandol should not be smaller than the amount found in Zinfandel, i.e. we find that
Bandol either has medium or high tannins.
Note that these data-driven approaches essentially use quantitative information to obtain a qualitative representation.
One reason for not using a purely quantitative approach is that the available data is not likely to be sufficiently informative
to build accurate conceptual space representations, but still allows us to discover information about qualitative relations
between regions. In the case of Example 10, for instance, the quantitative representation we start with represents each
concept as a point rather than a convex region. A second reason is that geometric calculations, such as determining convex
hulls or Voronoi tessellations, are computationally expensive in high-dimensional spaces. When all we are interested in are
spatial relations such as betweenness and parallelism, we can avoid to actually build the conceptual space, using a linear
programming approach that was proposed in [50]. Finally, as mentioned before, qualitative representations are invariant
w.r.t. changes in the relative importance of the different quality dimensions.
4.3. Regular mappings between conceptual spaces
In this section, we show how the idea of interpolation and extrapolation can be formalized, and explicate the assump-
tions that warrant such forms of inference. We start from the functional view on rule bases suggested in Section 3.2.
In particular, given the view of attribute domains as granular descriptions of conceptual spaces, we may look at map-
pings between attribute domains as granular descriptions of mappings between conceptual spaces. Let A= A1 × · · · × An ,
B = B1 × · · · × Bs and C = C1 × · · · × Ck be defined as before. As each Ai , B j and Cl correspond to a conceptual space,
also A, B and C correspond to conceptual spaces, which we will denote by A, B and C respectively. Note that the set of
quality dimensions underlying A is the union of the quality dimensions underlying the conceptual space representations of
A1, . . . , An and similar for B and C.
The mapping fR , induced by the knowledge base R , can then be seen as a mapping from subsets of B to subsets of
C. The nature of this mapping will strongly depend on the nature of the rules involved. For example, let us consider the
following rules
6 http://www.theworldwidewine.com/Wine_and_Food/This_wine_which_foods.php, accessed July 18th, 2011.
studio→ small
high-tannins∧ full− body→ opaque
museum∧ has-live-animals→ zoo
large∧ orchestra→ symphony
In these rules, the consequent is implied (only) by the meaning of the terms that appear in the antecedent, e.g. a museum
which has live animals is called a zoo, by definition of the word zoo. As a result, we can make the assumption that the
quality dimensions in C form a subset of the quality dimensions in B. This in turn means that there is a linear mapping m
(viz. a projection) from B to the lower-dimensional space C. The (known) mapping fR can then be seen as an approximation
of the (unknown) mapping m. Note that this means that there is an underlying functional dependency, e.g. every housing
option will have a specific size, and every wine will have a specific degree of transparency. We will refer to rules of this
kind as categorization rules.
Categorization rules can be contrasted with phenomenological rules, which encode observations about the world, e.g.:
morning→ heavy-traffic
autumn∧ UK→ rainy
While in the four previous rules, the conclusion is the consequence of a categorical definition, in case of phenomenological
rules, there is usually no underlying functional dependency: knowing the time of the day does not allow us to precisely
know the amount of traffic, while knowing the date and location does not allow us to precisely know the amount of rain.
Interestingly, a similar link between commonsense reasoning and functional dependencies was already pointed out in [51].
The method we propose in this paper is based on the assumption that a rule base approximates a linear mapping, and
thus only applies to categorization rules. However, it is worth noting that even for phenomenological rules, our method can
often produce plausible conclusions when it is applied locally, e.g. while we should not conclude that there is heavy traffic at
mid-day from the observations that there is heavy traffic in the morning and in the evening, it makes sense to conclude that
there is heavy-traffic mid-morning if we know that there is heavy traffic in the early morning and late morning. Moreover,
whether a rule classifies as phenomenological or not may depend on the underlying conceptual space representations that
are assumed. For instance, the conceptual space representation of morning may in fact include a quality dimension for the
amount of traffic, when mornings (in cities) and rush hour are considered to be so tied together that traffic jams become
a characteristic feature of mornings (in a similar way that flying has become a characteristic feature of birds, even if it is
not a defining feature). As a result of these considerations, when applying our method in practice, we would by default
assume that it contains categorization rules. When this does not introduce any inconsistencies, the conclusions it produces
are in some sense the most plausible ones, given the information that it available. When inconsistencies are introduced in
the process, however, we may need to partially revise the assumption that the rules are categorization rules and/or that the
conceptual relations we have are appropriate in the given context (i.e. take into account all the relevant features). While
interpolative and extrapolative reasoning are monotonic forms of reasoning in principle, in practice they would be applied
in a non-monotonic fashion, in the sense that adding more rules to a knowledge base may introduce inconsistencies, which
would then lead us to apply interpolation and extrapolation more cautiously (or not at all). In Section 8, we will come back
to the issue of how to deal with inconsistencies that are introduced by interpolative or extrapolative reasoning.
By taking the view that fR is the approximation of an unknown mapping m from points of B to points of C, we have
for X ⊆ B that reg( fR(X))⊇ {m(p) | p ∈ reg(X)}, where we write reg(X) for the geometric representation of X as a region
in B or C as before. More precisely, we take the view that the rule base R is compatible with some underlying mapping m
in the sense that for each X ⊆ B and Y ⊆ C it holds that(
R |HA
(∨
x∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
(∨
y∈Y
k∧
i=1
yi
))
⇒
(
m∗
(⋃
x∈X
reg(x)
)
⊆
⋃
y∈Y
reg(y)
)
(21)
where the 2B → 2C mapping m∗ is defined as the point-wise extension of m.
The actual conceptual spaces B and C, and a fortiori the mapping m, are inaccessible in most applications. For instance,
we cannot assume that a precise definition of a loft is available, or even an exhaustive enumeration of the qualities on
which such a definition would depend. Moreover, using our finite vocabulary, we can only encode approximations of the
mapping m, even in the face of complete knowledge. Let us write f̂ for the most informative approximation that can be
described using the available labels, i.e. f̂ is the 2B → 2C mapping defined for X ∈ 2B by
f̂ (X)=
{
y ∈ C
∣∣ x ∈ X,m∗(reg(x))∩ reg(y) 6= ∅}
In other words, fR corresponds to the knowledge we actually have, while f̂ corresponds to the maximal knowledge about
the mapping m that we could hope to obtain.
Fig. 5. Mappings from B (left) to C (right).
Example 11. Fig. 5 displays a setting where B and C consist of only one attribute domain, where B = B1 = {a,b, c,d, e, f , g,
h, i} and C = C1 = { j,k, l,n,o,u, v,w, x, y, z}. The mapping m maps each point from B to a point of C. The only knowledge
that we have about m is in the forms of rules in the rule base R , which act as constraints on the mapping m. Assume,
for example, that R contains the rule d→ n ∨ u ∨ v ∨ w , and no other information about d. Then we have that fR({d})=
{n,u, v,w}. This mapping fR is an approximation of the mapping m, for which e.g. m(p) = r and m(q) = s holds. Now
suppose that for every point x in reg(d) it holds that m(x) ∈ reg(n) ∪ reg(v), i.e. m∗(reg(d)) = {m(x) | x ∈ reg(d)} ⊆ reg(n) ∪
reg(v). Then the most precise mapping f̂ that can be described using the vocabulary offered by B and C is such that
f̂ ({d})= {n, v}. This means that the rule d→ n ∨ u ∨ v ∨ w could be refined to d→ n ∨ v , but this knowledge is missing
from R .
The mapping f̂ is not available to us either; it corresponds to the semantic counterpart of a complete rule base, i.e. a
rule base which entails all rules that are compatible with m. All we know about f̂ is that it is a refinement of fR .
Proposition 1. If R is compatible with m in the sense of (21), it holds that f̂ 6 fR .
Hence the goal of refining the knowledge base R corresponds, at the semantic level, to finding a mapping f̂R for which it
is known that f̂ 6 f̂R 6 fR . As all our domain knowledge is already encoded in R , a suitable f̂R 6= fR can only be obtained
from meta-knowledge about the mapping f̂ , or indirectly, from meta-knowledge about the mapping m. Here our restriction
to categorization rules plays a key role, as it suggests that m should satisfy the properties of a linear transformation. This
leads to the following postulates about the mapping m (p,q, r, s ∈B, λ> 0):
(bet1) bet(p,q, r)⇒ bet(m(p),m(q),m(r))
(bet2) bet(p,q, r)∧ d(p,q)= λ · d(r,q)⇒ d(m(p),m(q))= λ · d(m(r),m(q))
(par1) par(p,q, r, s)⇒ par(m(p),m(q),m(r),m(s))
(par2) par(p,q, r, s)∧ d(p,q)= λ · d(r, s)⇒ d(m(p),m(q))= λ · d(m(r),m(s))
In the following section, these postulates will be related to the commonsense inference principles that were introduced in
Section 3.1. Specifically, it will become clear that the validity of Principle (I) is tied to (bet1), the validity of (E) is tied to
(par1), the validity of (I’) is tied to (bet1) and (bet2), and the validity of (E’) is tied to (par1) and (par2).
5. Semantic characterization
To characterize interpolative and extrapolative inference, it is useful to note that knowledge can be described on three
levels, in the given setting. First, there is the syntactic level, where new rules are produced from given sets of rules. This
level will form the topic of Section 6. Second, there is the conceptual spaces level, where labels are represented as geometric
regions, and knowledge takes the form of relations between geometric representations of properties and concepts, as was
described in Section 4. Finally, there is an intermediate level which we will refer to as the semantic level, as it describes
knowledge in terms of a standard propositional logic semantics. In particular, as explained in the beginning of Section 3, the
elements of A take the role of interpretations of the propositional rules and formulas that we consider. This intermediate,
semantic level will form the topic of the present section. In particular, at the semantic level, we are interested in approxi-
mating the mapping m between the conceptual spaces B and C, as well as relations such as betweenness and parallelism,
using the vocabulary at hand. Typically, for a given conceptual space, a number of attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl will be
available, containing labels to refer to designated regions of the conceptual space. For the conceptual spaces B and C, these
are respectively the attribute domains B1, . . . , Bs and C1, . . . ,Ck . In general, the available attribute domains determine the
level of granularity with which we can describe the underlying conceptual space.
The considered setting of three levels requires us to take into account some subtleties regarding the notion of logical
consistency. A logical formula α was defined to be consistent w.r.t. D1×· · ·× Dl if there exists an element d ∈ D1×· · ·× Dl
that corresponds to a propositional model of that formula. However, in general, we are not guaranteed that d actually
corresponds to a non-empty region of the underlying conceptual space D. That is because some of the attribute domains
may refer to the same quality dimensions. For example, while blue ∧ wine may be consistent at the propositional level, it
corresponds to an empty set in the underlying conceptual space.
Let us call two attribute domains orthogonal if the sets of quality dimensions to which they refer are disjoint. In other
words, two attribute domains are orthogonal if their elements refer to different features of a given domain. In particular,
if two attribute domains A and B are orthogonal, for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B , a ∧ b will correspond to a non-empty set in
the underlying conceptual space, which can be seen as the Cartesian product of reg(a) and reg(b). In other words, fixing
the value of an attribute does not further restrict the possible values of the other attributes. For example, consider the
rule large ∧ detached→ lux from Example 2. The attribute domains A2 and A3 (corresponding to large and detached) are
orthogonal to each other, but neither is orthogonal to the attribute domain A4 (corresponding to lux). The concept of
orthogonality is closely related to the idea of logical independence.
We call a set X ⊆ D1 × · · · × Dl realizable if we are guaranteed that X contains at least one element that corresponds
to a non-empty region. If all of the attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are orthogonal, this is simply when X 6= ∅. In general, it
may happen that some attribute domains are not orthogonal, but that these attribute domains are irrelevant w.r.t. X . In
particular, we define a set X↓i which essentially contains the elements from X that do not depend on the ith attribute
domain:
(a1, . . . ,ai−1,ai+1, . . . ,al) ∈ X
↓i iff ∀x ∈ D i . (a1, . . . ,ai−1, x,ai+1, . . . ,al) ∈ X (22)
Now we can recursively define the notion of realizability. In particular, we say that X is realizable if (i) all attribute domains
underlying X are orthogonal and X 6= ∅ or (ii) there exists an i such that X↓i is realizable.
In this section, we will first analyse how conceptual relations can be defined between subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . In
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we will look at betweenness and parallelism, before also taking comparative distance into account
in Section 5.3. Finally, in Section 5.4, we will show how these relations can be used to refine the function fR , using the
postulates (bet1), (bet2), (par1) and (par2) that were introduced in Section 4.3. Throughout the section, we will assume
that the relations bet, bet, par and par are completely specified on the level of individual labels.
5.1. Betweenness
As explained in Section 4, our approach will start from available qualitative knowledge about the conceptual spaces
underlying the attribute domains A1, . . . , An . For three labels x, y, z ∈ Ai , we may know for example that y is fully between
x and z, i.e. bet(reg(x), reg(y), reg(z)) holds, or that y is partially between x and z, i.e. bet(reg(x), reg(y), reg(z)) holds. Such
betweenness information is sufficient for interpolative reasoning in situations where the antecedent of each rule consists
of a single atom, taken from some fixed attribute domain B , and where the consequent of each rule consists of a single
atom, taken from some fixed attribute domain C . To handle general rule bases, however, we need to lift the betweenness
information we have about labels (i.e. atoms) to betweenness information about complex formulas. At the semantic level
this means that we need information about the betweenness of subsets of Cartesian products D1 × · · · × Dl of attribute
domains. Indeed, each element of D1 × · · · × Dl corresponds to a conjunction of atoms at the syntactic level, hence subsets
of D1 × · · · × Dl correspond to arbitrary formulas. Note that each subset of D1 × · · · × Dl indeed corresponds to a region in
some underlying conceptual space D.
First we focus on characterizing betweenness for elements of D1×· · ·× Dl . A central observation is that betweenness for
a vector of labels cannot be reduced to betweenness for the labels in the respective components. In particular, notice that
when bet(a1,b1, c1) and bet(a2,b2, c2) hold, we do not necessarily have that (b1,b2) is between (a1,a2) and (c1, c2). Indeed,
even for points in a Euclidean space of dimension two or more, betweenness in each dimension does not entail collinearity.
Here the intuition of bet and bet as upper and lower approximations of betweenness becomes important. In particular, while
betweenness in each component is not sufficient, it is a necessary condition, hence the upper approximation of betweenness
can still be defined as:
bet(a,b, c) iff ∀ j.bet(a j,b j, c j)
where we write e.g. ai for the ith component of vector a. To extend bet to vectors of labels, first note that when the
attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are not orthogonal, we cannot provide any non-trivial guarantees as nothing is between the
regions corresponding to a and c when one of these regions is empty. Hence bet(a,b, c) is false unless a = b = c. On the
other hand, if the attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are all orthogonal, we define:
bet(a,b, c) iff (a= b)∨ (b= c)∨
(
∃ j.(∀i 6= j.ai = bi = ci)∧ bet(a j,b j, c j)
)
(23)
Indeed, in the cases where a= b or b= c, we trivially have that bet(a,b, c) holds due to the fact that bet(p, p,q) holds for
all points p and q. However, note that even in these trivial cases, we still need to require the orthogonality of the attribute
domains D1, . . . , Dl . In the case where a= b= c, on the other hand, we do have that bet(a,b, c) is trivially satisfied, even
if all three regions are empty (as can easily be seen from the definition in (16)). The last disjunct in the right-hand side of
(23) covers the general case, where we can only guarantee betweenness for a vector of labels if the vectors coincide in all
but one component.
Example 12. The quality dimensions underlying attribute domains A1 and A2 from Example 2 clearly overlap. For example,
it is not possible for a bungalow to also be an apartment, or for a loft to be a row-house. On the other hand, we may consider
that attribute domains A2 and A3 are orthogonal. Note that this orthogonality holds irrespective of whether there actually
exist apartments that are very-large. What is important is that nothing in the definition of an apartment prevents it from
possibly being very-large. As a result, we can derive e.g. that
bet
(
(apartment, small), (apartment, large), (apartment,very-large)
)
holds but not e.g.
bet
(
(bungalow,detached), (bungalow, semi-detached), (bungalow, row-house)
)
Now we move to betweenness of subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . In particular, we will define sets bet(X1, X2) and bet(X1, X2)
containing respectively those elements from D1 × · · · × Dl that are possibly partially between elements of X1 and elements
of X2 , and those elements that are guaranteed to be completely between elements of X1 and elements of X2 . For bet this
is straightforward:
bet(X1, X2)=
{
b |a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2,bet(a,b, c)
}
(24)
The following proposition shows that this definition is indeed correct in the sense that it is compatible with the geometric
notion of betweenness:
Proposition 2. Let X1 , X2 and Y be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . We have that
bet
(
reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2)
)
⇒ Y ∩ bet(X1, X2) 6= ∅
Note that we are slightly abusing notation here, writing bet both for a predicate which takes three regions as argument
(as defined in (15)), and for a set which takes two subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl as argument (as defined in (24)).
To define bet, the realizability of the arguments X1 and X2 again comes into play. We define:
bet(X1, X2)= Z ∪
{
b |a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2,bet(a,b, c)
}
(25)
∪
⋃
16i6l
x∈D i
{
(b1, . . . ,bi−1, x,bi+1, . . . ,bl) |b
(i) ∈ bet
(
X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2
)}
with
Z =

X1 ∪ X2 if X1 and X2 are realizable
X1 if only X2 is realizable
X2 if only X1 is realizable
X1 ∩ X2 otherwise
b(i) = (b1, . . . ,bi−1,bi+1, . . . ,bl)
The set Z intuitively corresponds to the trivial situations of betweenness a = b and b = c in (23). If X1 and X2 are real-
izable, this means that all elements from X1 and X2 should be considered to be between X1 and X2 . If X2 is realizable
but not X1 , we know that X2 corresponds to a non-empty region in the corresponding conceptual space. The set X1 ,
on the other hand, may or may not correspond to a non-empty region, the lack of realizability merely means that we
cannot guarantee that reg(X1) 6= ∅. In such a case, we cannot guarantee that the elements of X2 are between X1 and
X2 as this depends on whether or not X1 corresponds to an empty region. However, it is not hard to see from (16) that
bet(reg(X1), reg(X1), reg(X2)) holds regardless of whether reg(X1)= ∅. The case where only X1 is realizable is similar. If nei-
ther of X1 and X2 are realizable, betweenness can only be guaranteed for elements in X1 ∩ X2 , noting that reg(X1 ∩ X2)= ∅
as soon as one of reg(X1)= ∅ or reg(X2)= ∅ holds.
The second component in the right-hand side of (25) expresses that b is in bet(X1, X2) if it is between some element
from X1 and some element from X2 . The third component is needed to correctly address the case where some of the
attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are not orthogonal (in which case the second component is the empty set). In such a case, we
will only find elements that are guaranteed to be between X1 and X2 if the attribute domains which are not orthogonal to
the others are in some sense irrelevant. The following proposition shows the correctness of the definition of bet in (25).
Proposition 3. Let X1 , X2 and Y be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . We have that
Y ⊆ bet(X1, X2)⇒ bet
(
reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2)
)
Example 13. Let X1 = {(x,det, small) | x ∈ A1} and X2 = {(x,det, large) | x ∈ A1}, and assume that A2 and A3 are orthogonal
(considering that the size of a house is irrelevant in deciding whether it is e.g. detached or not), while A1 and A2 are not.
Noting that
bet
({
(det, small)
}
,
{
(det, large)
})
=
{
(det, small), (det,medium), (det, large)
}
we find bet(X1, X2)= {(x,det, y) | x ∈ A1, y ∈ {small,medium, large}}.
5.2. Parallelism
The treatment of parallelism is largely analogous to the treatment of betweenness. If the attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl
are all orthogonal, the relation par can be defined for elements of D1 × · · · × Dl as follows:
par(a,b, c;d) iff (a= c∧ b= d)∨ (c= d)∨
(
∃ j.
(
∀i 6= j.(ai = bi)∧ (ci = di)
)
∧ par(a j,b j, c j;d j)
)
(26)
As for betweenness, we find that a component-wise assessment of parallelism is not usually sufficient to provide guarantees
on the parallelism of the vectors. The exceptions covered by the definition of par are the trivial case where a= c and b= d,
the trivial case where c= d, and the case where the transition from a to b, and from c to d only affects one component. If
the attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are not orthogonal, we cannot guarantee anything about the parallelism of elements from
D1 × · · · × Dl , unless in the entirely trivial case where a= b= c= d.
For any Cartesian product D1 × · · · × Dl of attribute domains, par is defined as
par(a,b, c;d) iff ∀ j.par(a j,b j, c j;d j)
To assess parallelism w.r.t. subsets X1 , X2 and X3 of D1 × · · · × Dl , we define:
par(X1, X2, X3)= Z2 ∪ Z3 ∪
{
d
∣∣ a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3,par(a,b, c;d)}
∪
{
(d1, . . . ,di−1, x,di+1, . . . ,dl)
∣∣ d ∈ par(X↓i1 , X↓i2 , X↓i3 ),16 i 6 l, x ∈ D i}
∪
{
(d1, . . . ,di−1, x,di+1, . . . ,dl)
∣∣ d ∈ par(X↓x1 , X↓y2 , X↓y3 ),16 i 6 l, x, y ∈ D i,
D i orthogonal to D1, . . . , D i−1, D i+1, . . . , Dl
}
(27)
with
Z2 =
{
X2 if X1 ∩ X3 is realizable
X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3 otherwise
Z3 =

X3 if X1 and X2 are realizable
X2 ∩ X3 if X1 is realizable but not X2
X1 ∩ X3 if X2 is realizable but not X1
X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3 otherwise
and for y ∈ D i and X ⊆ D1 × · · · × Dl we define
(a1, . . . ,ai−1,ai+1, . . . ,al) ∈ X
↓y iff (a1, . . . ,ai−1, y,ai+1, . . . ,al) ∈ X
The set Z2 corresponds to those elements that can be added to par(X1, X2, X3) due to the trivial case where a= c∧ b= d
in (26), whereas Z3 corresponds to the trivial case where c = d. In particular, if X1 ∩ X3 is realizable we know that for
every point in X2 we can find a point which belongs to both X1 and X3 , hence (X1 ∩ X3, X2, X1 ∩ X3, X2) trivially defines
two parallel directions, hence so does (X1, X2, X3, X2). The definition of Z3 is based on the intuition that (X1, X2, X3, X3)
trivially defines two parallel directions, but only if X1 , X2 and X3 correspond to non-empty regions. As in the case of the set
Z in the definition of bet, we need to take realizability into account. The third argument of the union in the right-hand side
of (27) expresses the basic case: d is in par(X1, X2, X3) if there are elements in X1 , X2 and X3 such that the corresponding
directions are parallel. The fourth argument allows us to ignore irrelevant attribute domains, similar as in the definition of
bet in (25). For parallelism, however, there is another case where situations of parallelism in D1×· · ·×D i−1×D i+1×· · ·×Dl
may be extended to D1 × · · · × Dl , which is covered by the last argument of the union. The central idea is that when D i
is orthogonal to the other attribute domains, we can be more tolerant; note that X
↓i
2 × X
↓i
3 ⊆
⋃
y∈D i
X
↓y
2 × X
↓y
3 . Indeed, all
that is required is that we can extend vectors a, b, c and d in D1×· · ·× D i−1× D i+1×· · ·× Dl , by choosing the same value
x from D i to extend a and b and the same value y to extend c and d, without there being a requirement for x= y to hold.
On the other hand, regardless of the realizability of X1 , X2 and X3 , we always define:
par(X1, X2, X3)=
{
d
∣∣ a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3,par(a,b, c,d)}
The correctness of the proposed definitions is demonstrated by the following propositions.
Proposition 4. Let X1 , X2 , X3 and Y be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . We have that
Y ⊆ par(X1, X2, X3)⇒ par
(
reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y )
)
Proposition 5. Let X1 , X2 , X3 and Y be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . We have that
par
(
reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y )
)
⇒ Y ∩ par(X1, X2, X3) 6= ∅
5.3. Comparative distance
The relations betσ , betσ , parτ and parτ behave in general similar to their counterparts bet, bet, par and par. The main
exception is when σ = [λ,λ] or τ = [µ,µ] is a degenerate interval, i.e. a singleton, in which case betσ and parτ hold as
soon as these relations hold for each of the components, i.e. we have for each λ ∈ [0,1] and µ ∈ [0,+∞[ that
bet[λ,λ](a,b, c) iff ∀i.bet[λ,λ](ai,bi, ci)
par[µ,µ](a,b, c;d) iff ∀i.par[µ,µ](ai,bi, ci;di)
provided that the attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are orthogonal; otherwise, we still cannot provide any guarantees on be-
tweenness or parallelism beyond the trivial cases where a= b= c and a= b= c= d respectively. The underlying reason that
the definition of betσ becomes more tolerant when σ is a singleton is due to the fact that for points p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn),
q= (q1,q2, . . . ,qn), r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) in a Euclidean space, it holds that whenever we have qi = pi + λ(ri − pi) for all i, we
also have
−→
pq= λ ·
−→
pr; and similar for parτ .
If σ and τ are not singletons, betσ and parτ are defined as:
betσ (a,b, c) iff α1 ∨ α2 ∨ (a= b= c)∨
(
∃ j.(∀i 6= j.ai = bi = ci)∧ betσ (a j,b j, c j)
)
parτ (a,b, c;d) iff β1 ∨ β2 ∨
(
(a= b)∧ (c= d)
)
∨
(
∃ j.
(
∀i 6= j.(ai = bi)∧ (ci = di)
)
∧ parτ (a j,b j, c j;d j)
)
with
α1 ≡
{
a= b if 0 ∈ σ
⊥ otherwise
α2 ≡
{
b= c if 1 ∈ σ
⊥ otherwise
β1 ≡
{
(a= c)∧ (b= d) if 1 ∈ τ
⊥ otherwise
β2 ≡
{
c= d if 0 ∈ τ
⊥ otherwise
and where again we assume that D1, . . . , Dl are orthogonal. Note that betσ and parτ are essentially defined as bet and par
when σ and τ are not singletons, although some of the trivial cases only hold when they contain 0 or 1.
Moreover, in all cases betσ and parτ are defined like bet and par:
betσ (a,b, c) iff ∀ j.betσ (a j,b j, c j)
parτ (a,b, c;d) iff ∀ j.parτ (a j,b j, c j;d j)
Now we extend these relations to subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl . Let X1 and X2 be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl; we define
betσ (X1, X2)= Z1 ∪ Z2 ∪
{
b
∣∣ a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2,betσ (a,b, c)}
∪
{
(b1, . . . ,bi−1, x,bi+1, . . . ,bl)
∣∣ b ∈ betσ (X↓i1 , X↓i2 ),16 i 6 l, x ∈ D i} (28)
with
Z1 =
{
X1 if X2 is realizable and 0 ∈ σ
X1 ∩ X2 otherwise
Z2 =
{
X2 if X1 is realizable and 1 ∈ σ
X1 ∩ X2 otherwise
The situation for parτ is mostly similar as for par:
parτ (X1, X2, X3)= Z2 ∪ Z3 ∪
{
d
∣∣ a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3,parτ (a,b, c;d)}
∪
{
(d1, . . . ,di−1, x,di+1, . . . ,dl)
∣∣ d ∈ parτ (X↓i1 , X↓i2 , X↓i3 ),16 i 6 l, x ∈ D i}
∪
{
(d1, . . . ,di−1, x,di+1, . . . ,dl)
∣∣ d ∈ parτ (X↓x1 , X↓y2 , X↓y3 ),16 i 6 l, x, y ∈ D i,
D i orthogonal to D1, . . . , D i−1, D i+1, . . . , Dl
}
(29)
with
Z2 =
{
X2 if X1 ∩ X3 is realizable and 1 ∈ τ
X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3 otherwise
Z3 =

X3 if X1 and X2 are realizable and 0 ∈ τ or if X1 ∩ X2 is realizable
X2 ∩ X3 if X1 is realizable but not X2 and 0 ∈ τ
X1 ∩ X3 if X2 is realizable but not X1 and 0 ∈ τ
X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3 otherwise
Proposition 6. Let X1 , X2 , X3 , and Y be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl , let σ be a subset of [0,1] and τ a subset of [0,+∞[. We have that
Y ⊆ betσ (X1, X2)⇒ betσ
(
reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2)
)
Y ⊆ parτ (X1, X2, X3)⇒ parτ
(
reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y )
)
Proposition 7. Let X1 , X2 , X3 , and Y be subsets of D1 × · · · × Dl , let σ be a subset of [0,1] and τ a subset of [0,+∞[. We have that
betσ
(
reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2)
)
⇒ Y ∩ betσ (X1, X2) 6= ∅
parτ
(
reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y )
)
⇒ Y ∩ parτ (X1, X2, X3) 6= ∅
5.4. Refining the rule base
From Postulates (bet1), (bet2), (par1) and (par2), we know that for all regions A1, A2, A3 in B, it holds that:
m∗
(
betσ (A1, A2)
)
⊆ betσ
(
m∗(A1),m
∗(A2)
)
(30)
m∗
(
parσ (A1, A2, A3)
)
⊆ parσ
(
m∗(A1),m
∗(A2),m
∗(A3)
)
(31)
where m∗ is the point-wise extension of m as before, and (σ ⊆ [0,1], τ ⊆ [0,+∞[)
betσ (A1, A2)=
{
q
∣∣ ∃p ∈ A1, r ∈ A2, λ ∈ σ .bet(p,q, r)∧ −→pq= λ · −→pr}
parτ (A1, A2, A3)= {s | ∃p ∈ A1,q ∈ A2, r ∈ A3, λ ∈ τ .
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq}
In other words, we have that betσ (A1, A2) is the true set of points that are located between A1 and A2 with a relative
distance from A1 contained in σ , and similar for parτ (A1, A2, A3). In particular, we have that
betσ (A1, A2)⊆ betσ (A1, A2) (32)
betσ
(
m∗(A1),m
∗(A2)
)
⊆ betσ
(
m∗(A1),m
∗(A2)
)
(33)
parτ (A1, A2, A3)⊆ parτ (A1, A2, A3) (34)
parτ
(
m∗(A1),m
∗(A2),m
∗(A3)
)
⊆ parτ
(
m∗(A1),m
∗(A2),m
∗(A3)
)
(35)
Together with (30)–(31) and the monotonicity of f̂ w.r.t. set inclusion, this yields
f̂
(
betσ (X1, X2)
)
⊆ betσ
(
f̂ (X1), f̂ (X2)
)
(36)
f̂
(
parτ (X1, X2, X3)
)
⊆ parτ
(
f̂ (X1), f̂ (X2), f̂ (X3)
)
(37)
for all X1, X2, X3 ∈ 2
B .
Recall that the mapping f̂ is unknown to us, and corresponds to the semantic counterpart of the ‘ideal’ rule base,
containing all knowledge about m that can be encoded using the given vocabulary. However, given that f̂ 6 fR is assumed
to hold (i.e. all knowledge encoded in R is correct), (36) and (37) allow us to refine the mapping fR , which is at our
disposal, to the most conservative refinement f̂R that satisfies these two constraints, i.e. we define f̂R to be the largest
fixpoint, w.r.t. the ordering 6 defined in (14), of
f̂R
(
{x}
)
= fR
(
{x}
)
∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{
betσ
(
f̂R(Y ), f̂R(Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ betσ (Y , Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{
parτ
(
f̂R(X), f̂R(Y ), f̂R(Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ parτ (X, Y , Z)}
and f̂R(X) =
⋃
x∈X f̂R({x}). From the well-known Knaster–Tarski theorem [52], we know that this largest fixpoint exists,
and can be found in an iterative way as follows. Let f̂R
(0)
= fR and
f̂R
(i+1)(
{x}
)
= fR
(
{x}
)
∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{
betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
) ∣∣ x∈betσ (Y , Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{
parτ
(
f̂R
(i)
(X), f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ parτ (X, Y , Z)} (38)
and f̂R
(i+1)
(X)=
⋃
x∈X f̂R
(i+1)
({x}). It is clear that f̂R
(i+1)
6 f̂R
(i)
, i.e. this definition allows us to repeatedly refine the initial
function f̂R
(0)
. From the finiteness of the attribute domains B and C , it follows that this process must end, i.e. that there is
an i0 ∈N such that f̂R
(i0+1)
= f̂R
(i0)
= f̂R .
Proposition 8. Let fR , f̂ and f̂R be defined as before. It holds that
f̂R 6 fR
Moreover, if R is compatible with m in the sense of (21), it follows from Postulates (bet1), (bet2), (par1) and (par2) that
f̂ 6 f̂R
Example 14. Let us again consider the rules from Example 2, and let us determine the comfort level of a medium-sized
detached villa:
f̂R
({
(villa,det,med)
})
⊆ f̂R
(
bet(X1, X2)
)
⊆ bet
(
f̂R(X1), f̂R(X2)
)
⊆ bet
(
fR(X1), fR(X2)
)
= bet
({
(det, small,bas), (det, small, comf )
}
,
{
(det, large, lux)
})
=
{
(det, x, y) | x ∈ {small,med, large}, y ∈ {bas, comf , lux}
}
where X1 and X2 are as defined in Example 13. Furthermore, we also have
f̂R
({
(villa,det,med)
})
⊆ fR
({
(villa,det,med)
})
=
{
(det,med, x) | x ∈ A4
}
Together we thus find
f̂R
({
(villa,det,med)
})
⊆
{
(det,med,bas), (det,med, comf ), (det,med, lux)
}
6. Syntactic characterization
In this section, we will analyse how conceptual relations behave at the syntactic level, i.e. how available background
information on betweenness and parallelism of atoms can be lifted to relations between arbitrary propositional formulas.
Together with the meta-principles (S), (I), (I’), (E), (E’) and (D) introduced in Section 3.1, we will then be able to fully char-
acterize a commonsense inference relation, and show its soundness and completeness w.r.t. the semantics from Section 5.
As elements from A can be identified with interpretations, any propositional formula α naturally corresponds to a set
set(α) of elements S from A, which are the elements that correspond to the models of α, i.e. set(α)= {ω ∈A |ω |HA α}.
Conversely, every element a= (a1, . . . ,an) from A corresponds to an interpretation, which can syntactically be characterized
as a conjunction of atoms a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an; let us write conj(a) for the conjunction corresponding to a ∈A.
As input to the inference relation, in addition to the rule base R , we assume that a set of assertions Σ is given, which
specifies the conceptual relations at the atom level. We define the closure Σ∗ of Σ to be the (infinite) set of all assertions
that directly follow from assertions in Σ . In particular, we define Σ∗ as the smallest set of assertions which satisfies
Σ ⊆Σ∗ , and moreover for all a, b, c, and d:
betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ
∗ ⇒ bet1−σ (c,b,a) ∈Σ
∗
betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ
∗ ⇒ bet1−σ (c,b,a) ∈Σ
∗
betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ
∗ ∧ σ ⊆ σ ′ ⇒ betσ ′(c,b,a) ∈Σ
∗
betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ
∗ ∧ σ ⊆ σ ′ ⇒ betσ ′(c,b,a) ∈Σ
∗
parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗ ∧ τ ⊆ τ ′ ⇒ parτ ′(a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗
parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗ ∧ τ ⊆ τ ′ ⇒ parτ ′(a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗
betσ (a,a, c) ∈Σ
∗ ⇒ betσ (a,a, c) ∈Σ
∗
parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗ ⇒ parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗
0 ∈ σ ⇒ betσ (a,a, c) ∈Σ
∗
σ 6= ∅ ⇒ betσ (a,a,a) ∈Σ
∗
1 ∈ τ ⇒ parτ (a,b,a;b) ∈Σ
∗
0 ∈ τ ⇒ parτ (a,b, c; c) ∈Σ
∗
τ 6= ∅ ⇒ parτ (a,a,b;b) ∈Σ
∗
where we write 1 − σ for the set {1 − x | x ∈ σ }. Note that even though the set Σ∗ is infinite, it is straightforward to
decide whether a given assertion such as betσ (a,b, c) is in Σ
∗ from the definition of Σ . In the following, we will use the
assumption that the assertions in Σ are sound in the following sense:
betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ ⇒ betσ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)
)
(39)
betσ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)
)
⇒ betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ
∗ (40)
parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ ⇒ parτ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)
)
(41)
parτ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)
)
⇒ parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗ (42)
for all labels a, b, c, d from the same attribute domain Ai . In addition, the following assumptions are needed to show
completeness, although they can be abandoned when completeness is not required (or feasible):
betσ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)
)
⇒ betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ
∗ (43)
betσ (a,b, c) ∈Σ ⇒ betσ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)
)
(44)
parτ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)
)
⇒ parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗ (45)
parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ ⇒ parτ
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)
)
(46)
In the following, we do not explicitly consider bet, par, bet and par, seeing these relations merely as abbreviations for
bet[0,1] , par[0,+∞[ , bet[0,1] and par[0,+∞[ .
Before we can characterize the conceptual relations, we need a syntactic counterpart for the notion of realizability,
which played a key role in Section 5. As it turns out, at the syntactic level, realizability corresponds to a strong notion of
consistency. More precisely, a formula α is called consistent if it has at least one model. Given a formula α, let us write
domains(α) for the set of attribute domains to which α refers, i.e. for each atom a occurring in α, the attribute domain Ai
which contains a will be in domains(α). We then say that α is strongly consistent if there exists a consistent formula β such
that β |H α and all attribute domains in domains(α) are orthogonal to each other. The correspondence with realizability is
demonstrated by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. It holds that a formula α is strongly consistent iff set(α) is realizable.
To formalize what can be inferred from Σ , we again follow a normative approach. In particular, we consider that an
expression of the form α → β ✶σ γ is supported by Σ if it can be derived using the following rules.
(bet1) If betσ (a, x,b) ∈Σ then Σ ⊢ x→ a ✶σ b.
(bet2) If α2 |HA α1 , β1 |HA β2 , γ1 |HA γ2 and σ1 ⊆ σ2 , then whenever we have Σ ⊢ α1 → β1 ✶σ1 γ1 we also have Σ ⊢
α2 → β2 ✶σ2 γ2 .
(bet3) If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ then Σ ⊢ α → γ ✶(1−σ ) β .
(bet4) If β is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ σ , we have Σ ⊢ α → α ✶σ β .
(bet5) It always
7 holds that Σ ⊢ α → α ✶σ α.
(bet6) If Σ ⊢ α1 → β1 ✶σ γ1 and Σ ⊢ α2 → β2 ✶σ γ2 then Σ ⊢ α1 ∨ α2 → (β1 ∨ β2)✶σ (γ1 ∨ γ2).
(bet7) If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ , δ is strongly consistent and the attribute domains in domains(α)∪ domains(β)∪ domains(γ ) are
orthogonal to those in domains(δ), then Σ ⊢ α ∧ δ → (β ∧ δ)✶σ (γ ∧ δ).
(bet8) If Σ ⊢ α1 → β1 ✶[λ,λ] γ1 , Σ ⊢ α2 → β2 ✶[λ,λ] γ2 and the attribute domains in domains(α1) ∪ domains(β1) ∪
domains(γ1) are orthogonal to those in domains(α2) ∪ domains(β2) ∪ domains(γ2), then Σ ⊢ α1 ∧ α2 → (β1 ∧ β2) ✶[λ,λ]
(γ1 ∧ γ2).
(bet9) It holds that Σ ⊢⊥→ β ✶σ γ ,
where we write 1− σ as a shorthand for {1− λ |λ ∈ σ }. The soundness and completeness of these inference rules w.r.t. the
semantics from Section 5 is shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Assume that Σ satisfies (39) and (43). It holds that Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ can be derived from the inference rules
(bet1)–(bet9) iff set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )).
If Σ only satisfies (39) we still have that whenever Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ can be derived, we also have set(α) ⊆
betσ (set(β), set(γ )), i.e. inference is still sound. Conversely, to show that Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ can be derived whenever
set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )) holds, we only need (43).
Example 15. Consider the rules about wines from Example 10, and assume that the attribute domains are given by
A1 = {beaujolais,bardolino,valpolicalla, . . .}
A2 = {inexpensive,mid-range,above-average,high-end}
A3 = {low-tannins,mid-tannins,high-tannins}
A4 = {light-body,medium-body, full-body}
A5 = {light-red,medium-red,dark-red,opaque}
The assertions in Σ about A1 are assumed to have been obtained using data-driven techniques, as was explained in Sec-
tion 4.2. The assertions about A2 , A3 , A4 and A5 are obtained from the natural ranking of the labels, by assuming that
they are all represented in a uni-dimensional domain. Recall that in uni-dimensional domains, the relations betσ and betσ
coincide, as do parσ and parσ . In the following, we will assume that A1 and A2 are orthogonal, and that A3 and A4 are
orthogonal.
Using (bet1), we find:
Σ ⊢ barbera→ chianti✶[0,1] merlot (47)
Σ ⊢medium-body→ light-body✶[0,1] full-body (48)
and using (bet7):
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan∧med-body)→ (mid-tan∧ light-body)✶[0,1] (mid-tan∧ full-body) (49)
7 We implicitly do assume that σ 6= ∅ however.
Next, we consider formulas of the form β ✶σ γ → α
(bet1) We always have Σ ⊢ a ✶σ b→
∨
{x |betσ (a, x,b) ∈Σ
∗}.
(bet2) If α1 |HA α2 , β2 |HA β1 , γ2 |HA γ1 and σ2 ⊆ σ1 , then whenever we have Σ ⊢ β1 ✶σ1 γ1 → α1 we also have Σ ⊢
β2 ✶σ2 γ2 → α2 .
(bet3) If Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α then Σ ⊢ γ ✶1−σ β → α.
(bet4) If Σ ⊢ β1 ✶σ γ → α1 , Σ ⊢ β2 ✶σ γ → α2 then Σ ⊢ (β1 ∨ β2)✶σ γ → α1 ∨ α2 .
(bet5) If Σ ⊢ β1 ✶σ γ1 → α1 and Σ ⊢ β2 ✶σ γ2 → α2 then Σ ⊢ (β1 ∧ β2)✶σ (γ1 ∧ γ2)→ α1 ∧ α2 .
(bet6) It holds that Σ ⊢⊥✶σ γ → α.
Again we can show soundness and completeness.
Proposition 10. Assume that Σ satisfies (40) and (44). It holds that Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α can be derived from the inference rules
(bet1)–(bet6) iff betσ (set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(α).
Example 16. Continuing the wine example, we obtain from (bet1) that
Σ ⊢mid-tannin✶[0,1] low-tannin→ low-tannin∨mid-tannin (50)
Σ ⊢mid-tannin✶[0,1] mid-tannin→mid-tannin (51)
Σ ⊢medium-body✶[0,1] medium-body→medium-body (52)
Combining (50) and (51) using (bet3) and (bet4), we find
Σ ⊢ (low-tannin∨mid-tannin)✶[0,1] low-tannin→ (low-tannin∨mid-tannin) (53)
Combining (52) and (53), we find
Σ ⊢
(
(low-tan∨mid-tan)∧med-bod
)
✶[0,1] (low-tan∧med-bod)→
(
(low-tan∨mid-tan)∧med-bod
)
(54)
In a similar way, we can also consider expressions of the form δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉:
(par1) If parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ then Σ ⊢ d→ c ✄τ 〈a,b〉.
(par2) If α1 |HA α2 , β1 |HA β2 , γ1 |HA γ2 , δ2 |HA δ1 and τ1 ⊆ τ2 , then whenever we have Σ ⊢ δ1 → γ1 ✄τ1 〈α1, β1〉 we also
have Σ ⊢ δ2 → γ2 ✄τ2 〈α2, β2〉.
(par3) If α is strongly consistent and 1 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ β → α ✄τ 〈α, β〉.
(par4) We always
8 have that Σ ⊢ α → α ✄τ 〈α,α〉.
(par5) If α is strongly consistent, we always have Σ ⊢ β → β ✄τ 〈α,α〉.
(par6) If α and β are strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ γ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉.
(par7) If β is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ α → α ✄τ 〈α, β〉.
(par8) If α is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ β → β ✄τ 〈α, β〉.
(par9) If Σ ⊢ δ1 → γ1 ✄τ 〈α1, β1〉 and Σ ⊢ δ2 → γ2 ✄τ 〈α2, β2〉 then Σ ⊢ δ1 ∨ δ2 → (γ1 ∨ γ2)✄τ 〈α1 ∨ α2, β1 ∨ β2〉.
(par10) If Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉, φ and ψ are strongly consistent, and the attribute domains in domains(α) ∪ domains(β) ∪
domains(γ )∪domains(δ) are orthogonal to those in domains(φ)∪domains(ψ), then Σ ⊢ δ∧ψ → γ ∧ψ✄τ 〈α ∧ φ,β ∧ φ〉.
(par11) If Σ ⊢ δ1 → γ1✄[λ,λ] 〈α1, β1〉, Σ ⊢ δ2 → γ2✄[λ,λ] 〈α2, β2〉, and the attribute domains in domains(α1)∪domains(β1)∪
domains(γ1) ∪ domains(δ1) are orthogonal to those in domains(α2) ∪ domains(β2) ∪ domains(γ2) ∪ domains(δ2), then
Σ ⊢ δ1 ∧ δ2 → (γ1 ∧ γ2)✄[λ,λ] 〈α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∧ β2〉.
(par12) It holds that Σ ⊢⊥→ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉.
Proposition 11. Assume that Σ satisfies (41) and (45). It holds that Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from the inference rules
(par1)–(par12) iff set(δ)⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )).
8 We implicitly do assume that τ 6= ∅ however.
Example 17. Using (par1), we find
Σ ⊢ bandol→ zinfandel✄[0,+∞[ 〈barbera,barolo〉 (55)
Σ ⊢ high-tannins→mid-tannins✄[0,+∞[ 〈low-tannins,mid-tannins〉 (56)
Σ ⊢ full-body→medium-body✄[0,+∞[ 〈light-body,medium-body〉 (57)
Using (par10), we then obtain
Σ ⊢ (high-tan∧med-bod)→ (mid-tan∧med-bod)✄[0,+∞[
〈
(low-tan∧med-bod), (mid-tan∧med-bod)
〉
(58)
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan∧ full-bod)→ (mid-tan∧med-bod)✄[0,+∞[
〈
(low-tan∧ light-bod), (low-tan∧med-bod)
〉
(59)
Finally, we specify how formulas of the form γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ can be derived:
(par1) We always have Σ ⊢ c ✄τ 〈a,b〉→
∨
{d | parτ (a,b, c;d) ∈Σ
∗}.
(par2) If α2 |HA α1 , β2 |HA β1 , γ2 |HA γ1 , δ1 |HA δ2 and τ2 ⊆ τ1 , then whenever we have Σ ⊢ γ1 ✄τ1 〈α1, β1〉→ δ1 we also
have Σ ⊢ γ2 ✄τ2 〈α2, β2〉→ δ2 .
(par3) If Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α1, β〉→ δ1 and Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α2, β〉→ δ2 then Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α1 ∨ α2, β〉→ δ1 ∨ δ2 .
(par4) If Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β1〉→ δ1 and Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β2〉→ δ2 then Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β1 ∨ β2〉→ δ1 ∨ δ2 .
(par5) If Σ ⊢ γ1 ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ1 and Σ ⊢ γ2 ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ2 then Σ ⊢ (γ1 ∨ γ2)✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ1 ∨ δ2 .
(par6) If Σ ⊢ γ1 ✄τ 〈α1, β1〉→ δ1 , Σ ⊢ γ2 ✄τ 〈α2, β2〉→ δ2 then Σ ⊢ (γ1 ∧ γ2)✄τ 〈α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∧ β2〉→ δ1 ∧ δ2 .
(par7) It holds that Σ ⊢⊥✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ.
(par8) It holds that Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈⊥, β〉→ δ.
(par9) It holds that Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α,⊥〉→ δ.
Proposition 12. Assume that Σ satisfies (42) and (46). It holds that Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 → δ can be derived from the inference rules
(par1)–(par9) iff parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(α).
Example 18. Using (par1), we find
Σ ⊢mid-tan✄[0,+∞[ 〈low-tan,high-tan〉→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)
Σ ⊢ high-tan✄[0,+∞[ 〈low-tan,high-tan〉→ high-tan
Combining these two assertions using (par5) this yields
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)✄[0,+∞[ 〈low-tan,high-tan〉→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan) (60)
In entirely the same fashion, we arrive at
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)✄[0,+∞[ 〈mid-tan,high-tan〉→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan) (61)
Combining (60) and (61) using (par3) gives us
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)✄[0,+∞[ 〈low-tan∨mid-tan,high-tan〉→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan) (62)
Furthermore, we find using (par1):
Σ ⊢med-bod✄[0,+∞[ 〈med-bod, full-bod〉→ (med-bod∨ full-bod)
Σ ⊢ full-bod✄[0,+∞[ 〈med-bod, full-bod〉→ full-bod
which we can combine using (par5) to obtain:
Σ ⊢ (med-bod∨ full-bod)✄[0,+∞[ 〈med-bod, full-bod〉→ (med-bod∨ full-bod) (63)
We can then combine (62) and (63) using (par6) to conclude
Σ ⊢
(
(mt ∨ ht)∧ (mb∨ fb)
)
✄[0,+∞[
〈(
(lt ∨mt)∧mb
)
, (ht ∧ fb)
〉
→
(
(mt ∨ ht)∧ (mb∨ fb)
)
(64)
where we have further abbreviated the labels. Using (par1) we also find
Σ ⊢ dark-red✄[0,+∞[ 〈light-red,medium-red〉→ (dark-red∨ opaque)
Σ ⊢ opaque✄[0,+∞[ 〈light-red,medium-red〉→ opaque
Σ ⊢ dark-red✄[0,+∞[ 〈medium-red,dark-red〉→ (dark-red∨ opaque)
Σ ⊢ opaque✄[0,+∞[ 〈medium-red,dark-red〉→∨opaque
Σ ⊢ dark-red✄[0,+∞[ 〈medium-red,opaque〉→ (dark-red∨ opaque)
Σ ⊢ opaque✄[0,+∞[ 〈medium-red,opaque〉→ opaque
Applying (par5) this leads to
Σ ⊢ (dark-red∨ op)✄[0,+∞[ 〈light-red,med− red〉→ (dark-red∨ op) (65)
Σ ⊢ (dark-red∨ op)✄[0,+∞[ 〈med-red,dark-red〉→ (dark-red∨ op) (66)
Σ ⊢ (dark-red∨ op)✄[0,+∞[ 〈med-red,op〉→ (dark-red∨ op) (67)
and after applying (par4), we also find
Σ ⊢ (dark-red∨ opaque)✄[0,+∞[
〈
medium-red, (dark-red∨ opaque)
〉
→ (dark-red∨ opaque) (68)
We are now ready to show the soundness and completeness of the inference rules proposed in Section 3.1 w.r.t. the
semantics introduced in Section 5.
Proposition 13. Let R, Σ , B and C be defined as before, and let X ⊆ B and Y ⊆ C . It holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
can be derived from (S), (I’), (E’), (D), (bet1)–(bet9), (bet1)–(bet6), (par1)–(par12) and (par1)–(par9) iff
f̂R(X)⊆ Y
Example 19. We can now formalize the inference about wines from Example 10. Using (S), we find
(R,Σ) ⊢ chianti→ low-tan∧med-body (69)
(R,Σ) ⊢merlot→ (low-tan∨mid-tan)∧med-body (70)
(R,Σ) ⊢ barolo→ high-tan∧ full-body (71)
(R,Σ) ⊢ zinfandel→ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)∧ (med-body∨ full-body) (72)
(R,Σ) ⊢ low-tan∧ light-body→ light-red (73)
(R,Σ) ⊢ low-tan∧med-body→med-red (74)
(R,Σ) ⊢mid-tan∧med-body→ dark-red∨ opaque (75)
(R,Σ) ⊢ high-tan∧ full-body→ opaque (76)
Combining (47), (54), (69) and (70), we find using (I’):
(R,Σ) ⊢ barbera→ (low-tan∨mid-tan)∧med-body (77)
If we then combine (77) with (71), (72), (55) and (64), using (E’) gives us
(R,Σ) ⊢ bandol→
(
(mid-tan∨ high-tan)∧ (med-body∨ full-body)
)
(78)
Combining (73), (74), (75), (59) and (65), we get using (E’)
(R,Σ) ⊢mid-tan∧ full-body→ dark-red∨ opaque (79)
Similarly, combining (74), (75), (58) and (68)
(R,Σ) ⊢ high-tan∧med-body→ dark-red∨ opaque (80)
Repeatedly applying (D) to (75), (76), (79) and (80) yields
(R,Σ) ⊢ (mid-tan∨ high-tan)∧ (med-body∨ full-body)→ dark-red∨ opaque (81)
which together with (78), gives us
(R,Σ) ⊢ bandol→ dark-red∨ opaque
again using (D). Despite that nothing could be concluded about bandol wine using classical deduction, using a combination
of interpolative and extrapolative reasoning, we have found that its colour is either dark-red or opaque.
7. Complexity and implementation
In this section, we first show that interpolative and extrapolative reasoning is PSPACE-hard in general. We then show
in Section 7.4 that the complexity crucially depends on the number of attribute domains. In particular, we show that
implementations in polynomial time are possible when the number of attribute domains is small enough to be treated as a
constant (without placing any bounds on the number of attributes or the number of rules). From this result, it also follows
that the inference problem considered in this paper is decidable in EXPTIME. However, whether this problem is also in
PSPACE remains currently open.
7.1. Hardness
We prove that interpolative and extrapolative reasoning are PSPACE-hard, by showing a reduction from the dominance
problem for CP-nets [53]. We present two such reductions, one which is only based on interpolative reasoning and one
which is only based on extrapolative reasoning.
Our terminology and notations are based on the presentation of CP-nets in [54], where a generalization of binary CP-nets
is considered. The basic building blocks are conditional preference rules, which are expressions of the form p : xi > ¬xi (or
p : ¬xi > xi ) with p a propositional formula over a set of atoms V = {x1, . . . , xn} and xi an atom from V . The intuitive
meaning is that in situations where p holds, having xi true is preferred to having xi false. A (binary) GCP-net (generalized
ceteris paribus net) over V is a set of such conditional preference rules. An outcome is an n-tuple (I(x1), . . . , I(xn)) where I
maps each variable to a value from {true, false}, i.e. an outcome corresponds to a propositional interpretation. For the ease
of presentation, we will identify an outcome with its corresponding mapping I . Let I and J be two outcomes, which differ
only in the value of one variable xi , such that I(xi)= true and J (xi)= false. If a GCP-net N contains a rule p : xi >¬xi (resp.
p : ¬xi > xi ) such that the propositional formula p is satisfied by both I and J , we say that N sanctions an improving flip
from J to I (resp. from I to J ). Finally, we say that I dominates J , given N , if there is a sequence J = J0, J1, . . . , Jm = I
such that N sanctions an improving flip from J i to J i+1 for each i in {0, . . . ,m − 1}. The problem of deciding, given two
outcomes I and J , whether I dominates J is PSPACE-complete [54].
7.2. Reduction to interpolative reasoning
Given a GCP-net N and two outcomes I and J we now construct a rule base R and a set of assertions Σ such that
I dominates J iff a particular rule can be derived from R using interpolative reasoning. We consider an attribute domain
Y = {y0, y1, y2}, and one additional attribute domain Xi for each variable xi ∈ V , which is defined as
Xi = {xi, xi} ∪
{
x
p
i
∣∣ (p: xi >¬xi) ∈ N}∪ {xi p ∣∣ (p: ¬xi > xi) ∈ N}
The set of rules R is obtained by adding for each conditional preference rule of the form p: xi >¬xi in N the rule
p ∧ x
p
i → y2 (82)
and for each conditional preference rule of the form p : ¬xi > xi , we add to R the rule
p ∧ xi
p → y2 (83)
Finally, we also add the rule∧{
xi
∣∣ J (xi)= true,16 i 6 n}∧∧{xi ∣∣ J (xi)= false,16 i 6 n}→ y1 (84)
The underlying idea is combine rules of the form (84) with rules of the form (82) or (83) using inference rule (I’) to simulate
the idea of an improving flip. The antecedents of each of the newly generated rules will correspond to outcomes (where
a conjunct xi appears if xi is true in the outcome, and a conjunct xi appears otherwise). To this end, for each conditional
preference rule of the form p: xi > ¬xi we add the assertion bet[0,1](xi, xi, x
p
i ) to Σ and for each conditional preference
rule of the form p: ¬xi > xi we add the assertion bet[0,1](xi, xi, xi
p). We also add the assertion bet[0,1](y0, y1, y2).
Proposition 14. Let I , J , N, R, and Σ be as above. It holds that I dominates J , given N, iff
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧{
xi
∣∣ I(xi)= true,16 i 6 n}∧∧{xi ∣∣ I(xi)= false,16 i 6 n}→ y1 ∨ y2 (85)
7.3. Reduction to extrapolative reasoning
We now show that the idea of improving flips can also be simulated using extrapolative reasoning, i.e. using assertions
about the relations par and par in Σ . With each variable xi we now associate an attribute domain Xi = {xi, xi, x
′
i, x
′
i}. We
consider one additional attribute domain Y = {y0, y1, y2, y
−, y+} whose elements will again appear in the consequent of
rules. Intuitively, y1 is the degree to which outcome J is preferred, y0 is a lower degree of preference and y2 is a higher
degree of preference. Furthermore, y− represents a lower degree of preference than y+ , but the relation between y− and
y+ on the one hand, and y0 , y1 and y2 on the other hand will remain unspecified. For each conditional preference rule
p : xi >¬xi in N , we add the following two rules to R
p ∧ x′i → y
+ p ∧ x′i → y
−
The idea here is to indicate that the direction from having xi false to having xi true is towards more preferred outcomes
when p is true. By using the attributes x′i and x
′
i , rather than xi and xi we can talk about the effect of changing the value
of xi without the need to specify to what degree p ∧ xi and p ∧ xi are preferred. Similarly, for each preference rule of the
form p : ¬xi > xi , we add
p ∧ x′i → y
+ p ∧ x′i → y
−
Finally, we add the rule∧{
xi
∣∣ J (xi)= true,16 i 6 n}∧∧{xi ∣∣ J (xi)= false,16 i 6 n}→ y1
For each i, we add the assertions par[0,+∞[(x
′
i, x
′
i, xi; xi) and par[0,+∞[(x
′
i, x
′
i, xi; xi) to Σ . In addition, we add
par[0,+∞[(y0, y1, y1; y2) par[0,+∞[(y2, y1, y1; y0)
par[0,+∞[
(
y−, y+, y0; y1
)
par[0,+∞[
(
y−, y+, y0; y2
)
par[0,+∞[
(
y−, y+, y1; y2
)
par[0,+∞[
(
y+, y−, y2; y1
)
par[0,+∞[
(
y+, y−, y2; y0
)
par[0,+∞[
(
y+, y−, y1; y0
)
Proposition 15. Let I , J , N, R, and Σ be as above. It holds that I dominates J , given N, iff
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧{
xi
∣∣ I(xi)= true,16 i 6 n}∧∧{xi ∣∣ I(xi)= false,16 i 6 n}→ y1 ∨ y2
Corollary 1. The problem of deciding whether (R,Σ) ⊢ α → β is PSPACE-hard, even if either all betweenness information in Σ is
trivial, or all information about parallelism in Σ is trivial.
7.4. Implementation
In propositional logic, the number of possible interpretations is exponential in the number of atoms. In the present
setting, on the other hand, the number of interpretations strongly depends on the number of attribute domains. If the
number of attribute domains is small compared to the total number of atoms, the number of interpretations is essentially
polynomial. For example, if there are only two attribute domains A1 and A2 , each of which contains
n
2
atoms, then there
are ( n
2
)2 interpretations. In such cases, it makes sense to rely on implementation methods that operate at the semantic
level, even if that requires an enumeration of all interpretations.
Consider a rule base R , where the antecedents of rules are built from the atoms in B1, . . . , Bs and the consequents
are built from C1, . . . ,Ck . From Proposition 13, we know that we can fully characterize interpolation and extrapolation on
R by specifying the value of f̂R for each element (x1, . . . , xs) of B = B1 × · · · × Bs . Moreover, from (38), we know that
the function f̂R can be obtained in an iterative fashion, although the formulation in (38) cannot be used directly, as it
involves intersections that range over arbitrary subsets of interpretations (of which there are at least exponentially many)
and arbitrary subsets of [0,1] and [0,+∞[. The following proposition suggests a way to evaluate the right-hand side of (38)
in practice.
Proposition 16. Let x= (x1, . . . , xs). It holds that
f̂R
(i+1)(
{x}
)
= f̂
(i)
R
(
{x}
)
∩
⋂{
betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
)) ∣∣ c1 ∨ c2}
∩
⋂{
parτ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(β)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
)) ∣∣ c3 ∨ c4} (86)
where
c1 iff α = xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xi j−1 ∧ ai j ∧ xi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xir
and γ = xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xi j−1 ∧ ci j ∧ xi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xir
and Σ ⊢ xi j → ai j ✶σ ci j with B i1 , . . . , B ir all orthogonal
c2 iff α = ai1 ∧ · · · ∧ air and γ = ci1 ∧ · · · ∧ cir
and ∃λ ∈ [0,1].∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , r}.Σ ⊢ xi j → ai j ✶[λ,λ] ci j
with B i1 , . . . , B ir all orthogonal
c3 iff α = yi1 ∧ · · · ∧ yi j−1 ∧ ai j ∧ yi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ yir
and β = yi1 ∧ · · · ∧ yi j−1 ∧ bi j ∧ yi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ yir
and γ = xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xi j−1 ∧ ci j ∧ xi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xir
and Σ ⊢ xi j → ci j ✄τ 〈ai j ,bi j 〉
with B i1 , . . . , B ir all orthogonal
c4 iff α = ai1 ∧ · · · ∧ air and β = bi1 ∧ · · · ∧ bir and γ = ci1 ∧ · · · ∧ cir
and ∃µ ∈ [0,+∞[.∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , r}.Σ ⊢ xi j → ci j ✄[µ,µ] 〈ai j ,bi j 〉
with B i1 , . . . , B ir all orthogonal
Note in particular how Proposition 16 allows us to replace the range of the intersection over arbitrary subsets of B to a
range over conjunctions α, β and γ , of which there are polynomially many if the number of attribute domains is treated as
a constant. Moreover, note how for each choice of these conjunctions, there is only one minimal choice for σ or τ , which
can easily be found from Σ . This leads to the following procedure to characterize the function f̂R at the semantic level:
repeat the following until f̂R
(i)
= f̂R
(i−1)
, starting with i = 1, for each x ∈ B:
1. set S ← f̂R
(i−1)
({x});
2. for each non-empty subset {i1, . . . , ir} such that B i1 , . . . , B ir are all orthogonal:
(a) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , r} and for each ai j and ci j in B i j such that betσ (ai j , xi j , ci j ) ∈Σ for some σ ⊆ [0,1]:
i. set α ← xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xi j−1 ∧ ai j ∧ xi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xir
ii. set γ ← xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xi j−1 ∧ ci j ∧ xi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xir
iii. set S ← S ∩ betσ ( f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ )))
(b) for each λ ∈ [0,1] for which Σ contains relations of the form bet[λ,λ] , and each ai1 , . . . ,air , ci1 , . . . , cir such that for
each j it holds that bet[λ,λ](ai j , xi j , ci j ) ∈Σ or bet[λ,λ](ci j , xi j ,ai j ) ∈Σ or ai j = xi j = ci j :
i. set α ← ai1 ∧ · · · ∧ air ;
ii. set γ ← ci1 ∧ · · · ∧ cir ;
iii. set S ← S ∩ bet[λ,λ]( f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ )));
(c) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, for each yi1 , . . . , yi j−1 , yi j+1 , . . . , yir and for each ai j , bi j and ci j in B i j such that
parτ (ai j ,bi j , ci j ; xi j ) ∈Σ for some τ ⊆ [0,+∞[:
i. set α ← yi1 ∧ · · · ∧ yi j−1 ∧ ai j ∧ yi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ yir ;
ii. set β ← yi1 ∧ · · · ∧ yi j−1 ∧ bi j ∧ yi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ yir ;
iii. set γ ← xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xi j−1 ∧ ci j ∧ xi j+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xir ;
iv. set S ← S ∩ parτ ( f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ )));
(d) for each µ ∈ [0,+∞[ for which Σ contains relations of the form par[µ,µ] , and each ai1 , . . . ,air , bi1 , . . . ,bir ,
ci1 , . . . , cir such that for each j it holds that par[µ,µ](ai j ,bi j , ci j ; xi j ) or ai j = bi j and ci j = xi j :
i. set α ← ai1 ∧ · · · ∧ air ;
ii. set α ← bi1 ∧ · · · ∧ bir ;
iii. set γ ← ci1 ∧ · · · ∧ cir ;
iv. set S ← S ∩ par[µ,µ]( f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ )));
3. set f̂R
(i)
({x})← S .
Note that in step 2(a), it suffices to check whether betσ (ai j , xi j , ci j ) ∈ Σ to verify Σ ⊢ xi j → ai j ✶σ ci j , as all other cases
where Σ ⊢ xi j → ai j ✶σ ci j holds are covered in one way or another. Indeed, when betσ ′ (ai j , xi j , ci j ) ∈Σ , for some σ
′ ⊂ σ ,
we have
betσ ′
(
f̂R
(i−1)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i−1)(
set(γ )
))
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i−1)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i−1)(
set(γ )
))
so we do not need to consider betσ if we already consider betσ ′ . The case where betσ (ci j , xi j ,ai j ) ∈ Σ is handled
by swapping the definitions of α and γ . Finally, the cases where xi j = ai j or xi j = ci j do not need to be consid-
ered because then x ∈ set(α) and 0 ∈ σ , x ∈ set(γ ) and 1 ∈ σ or xi j = ai j = ci j ; in each of these cases we have
betσ ( f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ )))⊆ f̂R
(i−1)
({xi}). Similar considerations apply to (b)–(d).
It is clear that each of the steps (a)–(d) is polynomial in the size of B, as is the number of arguments x for which
these steps have to be completed. Finally, after each iteration, there is at least one element x from B for which f̂
(i)
R ({x})⊂
̂
f
(i−1)
R ({x}), unless f̂
(i)
R = f̂R after which we can stop. This means that the total number of iterations is upper bounded by
B× C , and is in particular polynomial in the size of A. This means that the above procedure runs in polynomial time if the
number of attribute domains n is small enough to be treated as a constant. In other words, interpolative and extrapolative
reasoning is decidable in exponential time, and is polynomial in data complexity.
Corollary 2. Let R, Σ , A1, . . . , An , B1, . . . , Bs and C1, . . . ,Ck be as before. Let β and γ be propositional formulas such that
domains(β)⊆ {B1, . . . , Bs} and domains(γ )⊆ {C1, . . . ,Ck}. The problem of deciding whether
(R,Σ) ⊢ β → γ
is in EXPTIME. If the number of attribute domains n is upper bounded by a constant, this problem is in P.
The restriction to have a relatively small number of attribute domains is a natural one in many application contexts. For
example, interpolation is often applied to sets of parallel if-then rules, in which case the antecedent of every rule is built
from the same attribute domains, and the consequent is a single atom, taken from a fixed attribute domain. In such a case
it is not common to have more than a few attribute domains. As another example, consider a rule base R = R1 ∪ R2 , such
that the antecedents of rules in R1 are built from the attribute domains B1, . . . , Bk , the consequents of rules in R1 and
antecedents of rules in R2 are built from the attribute domains C1, . . . ,Cs , and the consequents of rules in R2 are built
from the attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl , such that {B1, . . . , Bk} ∩ {D1, . . . , Dl} = ∅. In many situations, refining R1 and R2
separately would be equivalent to refining R as a whole. The following counterexample, however, shows that this is not the
case in general.
Example 20. Let R = R1 ∪ R2 with R1 = {a1 → a2, c1 → c2} and R2 = {a2 → a3, c2 → c3}, where the attribute domains are
A1 = {a1,b1, c1,d1}, A2 = {a2,b2, c2,d2} and A3 = {a3,b3, c3,d3}. Assume furthermore that Σ only contains the assertions
bet[0.5,0.5](a1,b1, c1), bet[0.5,0.5](a2,b2, c2) and bet[0.5,0.5](a3,b3, c3). Since R |H a1 → c1 and R |H a3 → c3 , using (S) and (I’),
we find (R,Σ) ⊢ b1 → b3 . However, using R1 only trivial information can be derived about b1 , hence refining R1 and R2
separately does not allow us to derive anything about b1 .
8. Discussion
As explained in Section 4.3, interpolative and extrapolative inference should provide sound conclusions as long as the
rule base can be seen as the approximation of a mapping m which is linear, or in the case of interpolation, monotonic. In
practice, however, this assumption may not be valid, in which case inconsistencies can be introduced by our method. In
such cases, interpolative and extrapolative reasoning could still prove useful, although it should be applied more cautiously.
Relaxing the linearity assumption
Consider the following rules, which contain information about the amount of traffic (light, moderate, heavy) at different
times during the day:
morning→ heavy-traffic (87)
mid-day→moderate-traffic (88)
evening→ heavy-traffic (89)
Using (I) and the assumption that
mid-day→morning ✶ evening
we then derive the rule
mid-day→ heavy-traffic
which is in conflict with (88). This can be explained due to a failure of the monotonicity assumption. In the case of (87)–(89)
the underlying mapping is not even deterministic, in the sense that the exact amount of traffic at e.g. 9 am may vary from
day to day (even if we assume that the rule base talks about weekdays in a specific city). Nonetheless, even for rules where
the linearity assumption fails, interpolation may still be useful. For instance, suppose we introduce the labels mid-morning
and mid-afternoon, which are between morning and mid-day, and between mid-day and evening respectively. From (87) and
(88) we may derive
mid-morning→moderate-traffic∨ heavy-traffic
Indeed, while the mapping underlying the rule base may, in principle, be arbitrary, it seems natural to assume that more
regular mappings would be more likely, i.e. we could make the assumption that any completion of the knowledge base should not
introduce additional irregularities. In particular, by identifying irregularities with violations of the monotonicity assumption,
this leads to the assumption that the conceptual space C1 corresponding with the antecedent of the rules can be partitioned
in a minimal number of segments, such that the mapping is monotonic over these segments. In the traffic example, we
would thus assume that the amount of traffic is monotonically decreasing throughout the morning and monotonically
increasing throughout the afternoon. While such conclusions would not be valid in general, they are reasonable to make
in absence of any other information. Depending on how the rule base (87)–(89) was obtained, we may also argue that the
absence of a rule for mid-morning suggests that this case is not special, i.e. that those cases which are irregular in some
sense would be more likely to be contained in the rule base.
To avoid inconsistencies, the above view suggests that from a rule base R we should try to identify subsets R1, . . . , Rk
of rules, such that no inconsistencies arise as long as interpolation is applied to two rules from the same set R i . To be
compatible with the above view, we should moreover insist that when α → α1 ✶ α2 , (α1 → β1) ∈ R i , (α2 → β2) ∈ R i and
(α → β) ∈ R , then we should have that (α → β) ∈ R i . In other words, the sub-bases R i should contain all rules that apply to
a given (convex) segment of the conceptual space C1 . In this way, we can ensure that when a new rule α
∗→ β∗ is derived
by interpolation from a sub-base R i , the rules in R i are indeed the most relevant ones, i.e. that they are the ones whose
antecedent is closest to α∗ in some sense. In a similar, but slightly less cautious fashion, we may assume that the mapping
underlying the rule base R is piecewise linear, and apply extrapolation locally to the sub-bases R1, . . . , Rk .
Restricting to the most salient properties
Another reason why inconsistencies may arise is because the information about betweenness or analogical change is not
accurate, or, more fundamentally, because it only takes the most salient properties of objects in the account. For example,
when we derive betweenness information for wines from wine–food pairings, it will mainly reflect the taste of the wine,
and to a much lesser extent properties such as price. As an additional example, we may consider that coffeehouses are
conceptually between bars and restaurants, as both coffeehouses and bars emphasise drinking rather than eating, while
coffeehouses generally do serve some food (sandwiches, cakes) as well. Nonetheless, we may consider that
bar→ serves-wine (90)
coffeehouse→¬serves-wine (91)
restaurant→ serves-wine (92)
Using interpolation and the assumption
coffeehouse→ bar ✶ restaurant
we derive the rule
coffeehouse→ serves-wine
which is in conflict with the rule base. In this case, the inconsistency is mainly due the fact that the property of
serving wine was not considered when asserting that coffeehouses are between bars and restaurants. The most natu-
ral way to avoid inconsistencies would then be to avoid applying interpolation to derive conclusions from the domain
A = {serves-wine,¬serves-wine}. In absence of any conflicts about attributes from a given domain, we then assume that
interpolative and extrapolative conclusions are valid for that domain, an assumption which may need to be revised if addi-
tional knowledge became available.
9. Conclusions and future work
The aim of this paper was to study the core principles underlying interpolative and extrapolative reasoning about cate-
gorization rules. We have argued that sets of categorization rules can be seen as partial specifications of a linear mapping
between conceptual spaces. This view has allowed us to describe interpolation and extrapolation at a purely qualitative level,
relying on qualitative spatial relations to encode knowledge about conceptual spaces rather than on degrees of similarity.
From a practical point of view, the approach is motivated from the observation that sufficient data to estimate the con-
ceptual relationship between labels from the same attribute domain is often available, e.g. relying on statistical techniques
such as multi-dimensional scaling or singular-value decomposition, while knowledge about how different attribute domains
are related is often sparse and is usually encoded in a symbolic form. The techniques presented in this paper show how
knowledge about conceptual relations between labels of the same attribute domain may be leveraged to refine whatever
symbolic knowledge of this kind we have. Although the general inference problem we have considered is PSPACE-hard, we
have shown that efficient implementations in polynomial time are possible if the number of attribute domains is sufficiently
small.
We may expect that the full generality of our framework would not be needed in many applications. In [34], for in-
stance, an approach is presented to complete rule bases purely based on analogical proportions. The proposal from [34]
in fact corresponds to a special case of the approach presented in this paper, where the only non-trivial information in
Σ are assertions of the form par[1,1](a,b, c;d) and par[1,1](a,b, c;d). In [34] it is moreover assumed that all labels corre-
spond to intervals in a uni-dimensional space, which implies that the relations par[1,1] and par[1,1] coincide, and moreover
that they exhibit a number of symmetry and transitivity properties that are not generally valid (e.g. par[1,1](a,b, c;d) iff
par[1,1](c,d,a;b)). These simplifications lead to an inference process which is easier to use in practice, but which is based
on assumptions that are not always realistic. By putting the approach from [34] in relation to the approach from this paper,
however, it immediately becomes apparent when these simplifications make sense, or how the approach should be adapted
when they do not.
In contrast, some applications may require further generalizations of the approach we have presented here. At the level
of the conceptual spaces, we have restricted ourselves to Euclidean spaces, whereas arbitrary metric spaces might be con-
sidered instead. Moreover, a better understanding is needed of which sets of assertions Σ are actually realizable, either in
a Euclidean space or in an arbitrary metric space. Currently, no sound and complete procedures are available to check the
consistency of such a set. Although this poses no problems when conceptual relations are obtained from geometric represen-
tations, consistency checking procedures may be important when other forms of acquisition are used (e.g. based on natural
language processing). In addition to betweenness and parallelism, other types of conceptual relations may also be consid-
ered, as the same methodology may be applied to any type of spatial relation that is invariant under linear transformations.
At the semantic level (Section 5), we have restricted ourselves to situations where only information about conceptual rela-
tion between individual labels is available. If, however, information would be available about the betweenness or parallelism
of disjunctions of labels, a refined definition of bet and par should be used, as e.g. reg(b) may geometrically be between
reg(a1) ∪ · · · ∪ reg(ap) and reg(c1) ∪ · · · ∪ reg(cq) even if reg(b) is not between reg(ai) and reg(c j) for any i and j. In such
a case, the syntactic characterization of Section 6 should be adapted as well. Given the presented setting, however, such a
generalization should be straightforward to formalize.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let X ⊆ B and Y ⊆ C be such that
R |HA
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
k∧
i=1
yi
)
(A.1)
By (21) this means that
m∗
(⋃
x∈X
reg(x)
)
⊆
⋃
y∈Y
reg(y)
and given that m∗ is a point-wise extension of the mapping m, we also have that⋃
x∈X
m∗
(
reg(x)
)
⊆
⋃
y∈Y
reg(y)
This means in particular that as soon as m∗(reg(x)) ∩ reg(y0) 6= ∅ for a given x ∈ X and y0 ∈ C , we must have that y0 ∈ Y .
In other words, we have that f̂ (X)⊆ Y , and since this holds for every Y satisfying (A.1), we obtain f̂ (X)⊆ fR(X). ✷
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that bet(reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2)) holds. Then there are x1 ∈ reg(X1), y ∈ reg(Y ) and x2 ∈
reg(X2) such that y is between x1 and x2 . Due to the fact that the labels of each attribute domain correspond to JEPD
properties, there are (unique) elements a ∈ X1 , b ∈ Y and c ∈ X2 such that x1 ∈ reg(a), y ∈ reg(b) and x2 ∈ reg(c). To
complete the proof, it suffices to show that for every i, it holds that bet(ai,bi, ci), i.e. that there exist points xi ∈ reg(ai),
yi ∈ reg(bi), and zi ∈ reg(ci) such that yi is between xi and zi . As betweenness is preserved under projection, the points xi ,
yi and zi can be obtained from x, y and z after removing all irrelevant components. ✷
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume that Y ⊆ bet(X1, X2). We need to show
∀q ∈ reg(Y ).∃p ∈ reg(X1), r ∈ reg(X2).(p = q)∨
(
∃λ ∈ [0,1].
−→
pq= λ ·
−→
pr
)
If q ∈ X1 ∩ X2 , we can simply take p = r = q. If q ∈ X1 \ X2 , then X2 is realizable and we can take p = q and an arbitrary
r ∈ reg(X2) 6= ∅. Similarly, if q ∈ X2 \ X1 we can take p ∈ reg(X1) 6= ∅ arbitrary and choose r = q.
For q ∈ reg({b |a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2,bet(a,b, c)}), note that the fact that bet(a,b, c) holds entails that the underlying attribute
domains are all orthogonal (unless in the entirely trivial case where a = b = c). If a = b, it suffices to take p = q and
let r be an arbitrary element from reg(X2), and similar for the case where b = c. Otherwise, the vectors a = (a1, . . . ,al),
b = (b1, . . . ,bl) and c = (c1, . . . , cl) only differ in the ith component for some i, and we have bet(ai,bi, ci). Now, given
bet(ai,bi, ci), we know that for each qi ∈ reg(bi) there are pi ∈ reg(ai) and ri ∈ reg(ci) such that qi is between pi and ri . As
the attribute domains are orthogonal, and the vectors a, b and c agree on all but the ith component, it is easy to see that
we then also have that for each q ∈ reg(b) there are p ∈ reg(a) and r ∈ reg(c) such that q is between p and r; it suffices to
extend pi , qi and ri by choosing identical values for the added components.
Finally, for q ∈ reg({(b1, . . . ,bi−1, x,bi+1, . . . ,bl) | b ∈ bet(X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 ),16 i 6 l, x ∈ D i}), we know by induction that for each
i and q′ ∈ reg(Y ↓i) there are p′ ∈ reg(X
↓i
1 ) and r
′ ∈ reg(X
↓i
2 ) such that q
′ is between p′ and r′ . By construction, we can
extend q′ to a point q ∈ reg(Y ) by choosing an arbitrary value for each of the quality dimensions underlying D i that do not
already appear in q′ . In the same way, we can then extend p′ to p ∈ reg(X1) and r
′ to r ∈ reg(X2) by filling in the same
values for the added quality dimensions. ✷
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that Y ⊆ par(X1, X2, X3). We need to show
∀s ∈ reg(Y ).∃p ∈ reg(X1),q ∈ reg(X2), r ∈ reg(X3).∃λ> 0.
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq
If s ∈ X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3 , we can take p = q = r = s. If s ∈ (X1 ∩ X2) \ X3 , we know that X1 is realizable and thus reg(X1) 6= ∅.
We can then take p arbitrary and choose q = r = s. Similarly if s ∈ (X1 ∩ X3) \ X2 , we can choose p = r = s and take
q ∈ reg(X2) 6= ∅ arbitrary. If s ∈ X3 \ (X1 ∪ X2), we know that X1 and X2 are realizable, and we can take p ∈ reg(X1) 6= ∅
and q ∈ reg(X2) 6= ∅ arbitrary, and choose r = s. If s ∈ X2 \ (X1 ∪ X3), we know that reg(X1 ∩ X3) 6= ∅, hence we can take an
arbitrary r ∈ reg(X1 ∩ X3) and choose p = r and q= s.
For s ∈ reg({d | a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3,par(a,b, c;d)}), note that the fact that par(a,b, c;d) holds entails that the under-
lying attribute domains are all orthogonal (with the exception of the trivial case where a= b= c= d). If a= c and b= d,
it suffices to take q = s and let p = r be an arbitrary element from reg(a) = reg(c). If c = d, we can take r = s and let
p and q be arbitrary elements from reg(a) and reg(b) respectively. Otherwise, we have that the vectors a = (a1, . . . ,al),
b= (b1, . . . ,bl), c= (c1, . . . , cl) and d= (d1, . . . ,dl) are such that for some j, it holds that par(a j,b j, c j;d j), whereas for all
i 6= j we have ai = bi and ci = di . From par(a j,b j, c j;d j) we know that there are points p j ∈ reg(a j), q j ∈ reg(b j), r j ∈ reg(c j)
and s j ∈ reg(d j) such that
−−→
r js j = λ ·
−−−→
p jq j for some λ> 0. Given the orthogonality of the attribute domains and the fact that
ai = bi for i 6= j, p j and q j can be extended to points p ∈ reg(a) and q ∈ reg(b) by choosing the same value for all added
components. In the same way we can extend r j and s j to points r ∈ reg(c) and s ∈ reg(d) by choosing the same value for
the added components. We then have that
−→
rs= λ ·
−→
pq, with λ as before.
For s ∈ reg({(d1, . . . ,di−1, x,di+1, . . . ,dl) | d ∈ par(X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 , X
↓i
3 ),16 i 6 l, x ∈ D i}), we know by induction that for each i
and s′ ∈ reg(Y ↓i) there are p′ ∈ reg(X
↓i
1 ), q
′ ∈ reg(X
↓i
2 ) and r
′ ∈ reg(X
↓i
3 ) such that
−−−→
p′q′ = λ ·
−−→
r′s′ for some λ > 0. By construc-
tion, we can extend s′ to a point s ∈ reg(Y ) by choosing an arbitrary value for each of the quality dimensions underlying
D i that do not already appear in s
′ . In the same way, we can then extend p′ to p ∈ reg(X1), q
′ to q ∈ reg(X2) and r
′ to r ∈
reg(X3) by filling in the same values for the added quality dimensions. The case where s ∈ reg({(d1, . . . ,di−1, x,di+1, . . . ,dl) |
d ∈ par(X
↓x
1 , X
↓y
2 , X
↓y
3 ),1 6 i 6 l, x ∈ D i, y ∈ D i, D i orthogonal to D1, . . . , D i−1, D i+1, . . . , Dl}) is analogous, noting that the
orthogonality of D i means that none of the attribute domains underlying D i will appear in s
′ , p′ , q′ and r′ . ✷
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that par(reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y )) holds. Then there are x1 ∈ reg(X1), x2 ∈ reg(X2),
x3 ∈ reg(X3) and y ∈ reg(Y ) such that
−−→
x3 y = λ ·
−−−→
x1x2 holds. Due to the fact that the labels of each attribute domain corre-
spond to JEPD properties, there are (unique) elements a ∈ X1 , b ∈ X2 , c ∈ X3 and d ∈ Y such that x1 ∈ reg(a), x2 ∈ reg(b),
x3 ∈ reg(c) and y ∈ reg(d). To complete the proof, it suffices to show that for every i, it holds that par(ai,bi, ci;di), i.e.
that there exist points x1i ∈ reg(ai), x
2
i ∈ reg(bi), x
3
i ∈ reg(ci) and yi ∈ reg(di) such that
−−−→
x3i yi = µ ·
−−−→
x1i x
2
i for some µ > 0. As
parallelism is preserved under projection, the points x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i and yi can be obtained from x
1 , x2 , x3 and y after removing
all irrelevant components, in which case the latter equality will hold for µ= λ. ✷
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is largely analogous to the proof of Propositions 3 and 4, except for the case of degenerate
intervals. For that case, we need to verify that for λ ∈ [0,1] and µ ∈ [0,+∞[, it holds that(
∀i. bet[λ,λ](ai,bi, ci)
)
⇒ bet[λ,λ]
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)
)
(A.2)(
∀i. par[µ,µ](ai,bi, ci;di)
)
⇒ par[µ,µ]
(
reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)
)
(A.3)
provided that the underlying attribute domains D1, . . . , Dl are all orthogonal. To show (A.2), suppose that bet[λ,λ](ai,bi, ci))
for all i. This means that for every qi ∈ reg(bi), there are pi ∈ reg(ai) and ri ∈ reg(ci) such that
−−−→
piqi = λ ·
−−→
piri . Let
these points be of the form pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
ni
i ), qi = (q
1
i , . . . ,q
ni
i ) and ri = (r
1
i , . . . , r
ni
i ). Now let q be a point from
reg(b). Without lack of generality, given the fact that the attribute domains are orthogonal, we can assume that q
is of the form (q11, . . . ,q
n1
1 , . . . ,q
1
l
, . . . ,q
nl
l
). We can moreover construct the points p = (p11, . . . , p
n1
1 , . . . , p
1
l
, . . . , p
nl
l
) and
r = (r11, . . . , r
n1
1 , . . . , r
1
l
, . . . , r
nl
l
). By construction, we then have that p ∈ reg(a), r ∈ reg(c) and
−→
pq = λ ·
−→
pr. As we can do this
for every q ∈ reg(b), we have shown (A.2).
The proof of (A.3) is entirely analogous. ✷
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Propositions 2 and 5. ✷
Proof of Proposition 8. From the definitions of fR and f̂R we immediately find that
f̂R(X)=
⋃
x∈X
f̂R
(
{x}
)
⊆
⋃
x∈X
fR
(
{x}
)
= fR(X)
and thus f̂R 6 fR . To show that f̂ 6 f̂R we show by induction that f̂ 6 f̂R
(i)
for all i ∈N. The case where i = 0 was shown
in Proposition 1. Assuming that we have already established f̂ 6 f̂R
(i)
, from the monotonicity of betσ and parτ w.r.t. set
inclusion we find that
f̂R
(i+1)(
{x}
)
= fR
(
{x}
)
∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{
betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ betσ (Y , Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{
parτ
(
f̂R
(i)
(X), f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ parτ (X, Y , Z)}
⊇ fR
(
{x}
)
∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{
betσ
(
f̂ (Y ), f̂ (Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ betσ (Y , Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{
parτ
(
f̂ (X), f̂ (Y ), f̂ (Z)
) ∣∣ x ∈ parτ (X, Y , Z)}
⊇ f̂
(
{x}
)
where the last step follows from f̂ ({x})⊆ fR({x}) (since f̂ 6 fR by Proposition 1), together with (36) and (37). Finally note
that f̂ (X)=
⋃
x∈X f̂ ({x}) by definition of f̂ . ✷
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that α is strongly consistent, and let β be such that β |H α, β is consistent, and all attribute
domains in domains(β) are orthogonal. As set(β) ⊆ set(α) we also have (set(β)↓i1 )↓i2 . . . ↓is ⊆ (set(α)↓i1 )↓i2 . . . ↓is for all
i1, . . . , is . If the positions i1, . . . , is refer to all attribute domains that are outside domains(β), then clearly (set(β)
↓i1 )↓i2 . . .↓is
is non-empty and only contains components referring to orthogonal attribute domains anymore. This means that also
(set(α)↓i1 )↓i2 . . .↓is is non-empty and refers to orthogonal attribute domains, which means that set(α) is realizable.
Conversely, assume that set(α) is realizable, then there exist positions i1, . . . , is such that (set(α)
↓i1 )↓i2 . . .↓is is non-
empty and only refers to orthogonal attribute domains. For b ∈ (set(α)↓i1 )↓i2 . . .↓is we then find that conj(b) |H α while all
attribute domains in domains(conj(b)) are orthogonal, which means that α is strongly consistent. ✷
Proof of Proposition 9.
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ can be derived from the inference rules (bet1)–(bet9). We show by induction that
set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )).
If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet1), then α, β and γ are atoms and we have that betσ (β,α,γ ) ∈Σ , from
which we find using (39) that betσ (reg(β), reg(α), reg(γ )) holds which is the same as betσ (set(β), set(α), set(γ )) be-
cause α, β and γ are atoms. We then easily find that set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )). Indeed, applying the definition of
betσ , given by (28), all attribute domains except for the one in which α, β and γ occur are deemed irrelevant, in which
case betσ (set(β), set(γ )) reduces to betweenness at the atom level.
If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet2), then there exist α
′ , β ′ , γ ′ and σ ′ such that α |HA α
′ , β ′ |HA β and
γ ′ |HA γ , Σ ⊢ α
′ → β ′ ✶σ ′ γ
′ , and σ ′ ⊆ σ . By induction, we then have that set(α′)⊆ betσ ′ (set(β
′), set(γ ′)), while we
have set(α)⊆ set(α′), set(β ′)⊆ set(β) and set(γ ′)⊆ set(γ ). By the fact that bet is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion,
it follows that
set(α)⊆ set
(
α′
)
⊆ betσ ′
(
set
(
β ′
)
, set
(
γ ′
))
⊆ betσ
(
set(β), set(γ )
)
In the case where Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet3), we already have set(α) ⊆ bet1−σ (set(γ ), set(β)). From
the symmetry of the betweenness relation, we then immediately find that also set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )).
In the case where Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet4), the strong consistency of β ensures that set(β) is
realizable. By definition, we then have set(α)⊆ betσ (set(α), set(β)), given that 0 ∈ σ .
The case where Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet5) directly follows from the fact that we have set(α) ⊆
betα(set(α), set(α)) for any α. Indeed, from (28) is follows that betσ (X1, X2)⊇ X1 ∩ X2 .
If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet6), then there exist α1 , α2 , β1 , β2 , γ1 and γ2 such that α = α1 ∨ α2 ,
β = β1 ∨ β2 , γ = γ1 ∨ γ2 and, by induction, set(α1) ⊆ betσ (set(β1), set(γ1)) and set(α2) ⊆ betσ (set(β2), set(γ2)). Now,
we have that
betσ
(
set(β), set(γ )
)
= betσ
(
set(β1 ∨ β2), set(γ1 ∨ γ2)
)
= betσ
(
set(β1)∪ set(β2), set(γ1)∪ set(γ2)
)
From the monotonicity of betσ w.r.t. set inclusion, we find that the latter expression includes both betσ (set(β1), set(γ1))
and betσ (set(β2), set(γ2)), and thus also betσ (set(β1), set(γ1)) ∪ betσ (set(β2), set(γ2)), which in turn includes set(α1) ∪
set(α2). By definition of set the latter expression is equivalent to set(α1 ∨ α2) and thus to set(α).
If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ was obtained from (bet7), then there exist α
′ , β ′ , γ ′ and δ such that α = α′ ∧ δ, β = β ′ ∧ δ,
γ = γ ′ ∧ δ and, by induction, set(α′)⊆ betσ (set(β
′), set(γ ′)). If set(α)⊆ set(β ′) or set(α)⊆ set(γ ′), the proof is trivial,
so assume that this were not the case. Since δ is strongly consistent, we can assume without lack of generality that the
attribute domains in domains(δ) are orthogonal to each other (since if this were not the case, we could replace δ with
a logically equivalent formula for which this is the case). Since the elements of domains(δ) are moreover orthogonal to
the elements of domains(β ′) and domains(γ ′), it is not hard to see that betσ (set(β
′), set(γ ′)) ∩ set(δ) ⊆ betσ (set(β
′) ∩
set(δ), set(γ ′) ∩ set(δ)). Indeed, this is trivial if β ′ or γ ′ is not strongly consistent. If both are strongly consistent, then
let b ∈ betσ (set(β
′), set(γ ′)) ∩ set(δ) and let b′ be the vector obtained from b after removing the components of all
irrelevant attribute domains. Then there are corresponding subvectors a′ and c′ of elements in set(β ′) and set(γ ′)
respectively, such that betσ (a
′,b′, c′) holds. Now a′ , b′ and c′ can be extended to vectors a′′ , b′′ and c′′ by adding the
components from domains(δ), choosing the same values as in b. Then it clearly holds that betσ (a
′′,b′′, c′′), while any
extension of a′′ and b′′ to full vectors a and b will belong to set(δ), leading to b ∈ betσ (set(β
′)∩ set(δ), set(γ ′)∩ set(δ)).
Hence, we have set(α′)∩ set(δ)⊆ betσ (set(β
′)∩ set(δ), set(γ ′)∩ set(δ)), which is equivalent to set(α′∧ δ)⊆ betσ (set(β
′ ∧
δ), set(γ ′ ∧ δ)) and to set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )).
If Σ ⊢ α → β ✶ γ was obtained from (bet8), there are α1 , α2 , β1 , β2 , γ1 and γ2 such that α = α1∧α2 , β = β1∧β2 and
γ = γ1 ∧ γ2 , such that, by induction, set(α1)⊆ bet[λ,λ](set(β1), set(γ1)) and set(α2)⊆ bet[λ,λ](set(β2), set(γ2)). Given the
definition of bet[λ,λ] and given the fact that the attribute domains in domains(β1)∪ domains(γ1) are orthogonal to those
in domains(β2) ∪ domains(γ2), we can show that bet[λ,λ](set(β1), set(γ1)) ∩ bet[λ,λ](set(β2), set(γ2)) ⊆ bet[λ,λ](set(β1) ∩
set(β2), set(γ1) ∩ set(γ2)). If λ = 0 or λ = 1 then this is trivial. If λ ∈]0,1[, from b ∈ bet[λ,λ](set(β1), set(γ1)) ∩
bet[λ,λ](set(β2), set(set(γ2)), we find that there are two non-overlapping subvectors b1 and b2 of b (containing com-
ponents for the attribute domains in domains(β1) ∪ domains(γ1) and domains(β2) ∪ domains(γ2) respectively) and such
that bet[λ,λ](a1,b1, c1) and bet[λ,λ](a2,b2, c2) hold, for appropriate subvectors of elements a and c from set(β1 ∧ β2)
and set(γ1 ∧ γ2). By definition of bet[λ,λ] , we then get that bet[λ,λ](a12,b12, c12) holds for the compound vectors, from
which we find that b ∈ bet[λ,λ](set(β1)∩ set(β2), set(γ1)∩ set(γ2)). Thus we find that
set(α1)∩ set(α2)⊆ betσ
(
set(β1)∩ set(β2), set(γ1)∩ set(γ2)
)
which is equivalent to set(α1 ∧ α2)⊆ betσ (set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2)) and to set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )).
The case where Σ ⊢ α → β ✶ γ was obtained from (bet9) is trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that set(α)⊆ betσ (set(β), set(γ )) and show that Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ can be derived from the inference
rules (bet1)–(bet9). If α is inconsistent, then Σ ⊢ α → β ✶σ γ follows from (bet9) and (bet2). Otherwise, given that
(bet2) entails syntax-independence, we can assume without lack of generality that α is of the form α1∨ · · ·∨αr , where
each αi is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from each attribute domain. In other words, set(αi) = {a} is a
singleton. Because of inference rules (bet6) and (bet2), it suffices to show that Σ ⊢ αi → β ✶σ γ can be derived for
each i.
The fact that a ∈ betσ (set(β), set(γ )) either means that (i) a ∈ set(β) ∪ set(γ ), (ii) there is a b ∈ set(β) and c ∈ set(γ )
such that betσ (b,a, c) holds, or (iii) it holds that a
↓ j ∈ betσ (set(β)
↓ j, set(γ )↓ j) for some j, where we write a↓ j for the
vector a without the jth component and set(β)↓ j and set(γ )↓ j are defined as in (22).
In the first case, if a ∈ set(β) \ set(γ ) this means that set(γ ) is realizable and 0 ∈ σ (by (28)), hence that γ is strongly
consistent (by Lemma 1). This means that we can derive Σ ⊢ αi → αi ✶σ γ using (bet4). Using (bet2), we can then also
conclude Σ ⊢ αi → β ✶σ γ given that a ∈ set(β). In the same way, if a ∈ set(γ ) \ set(β), we derive Σ ⊢ αi → γ ✶1−σ β ,
and using (bet3) also Σ ⊢ αi → β ✶σ γ . If a ∈ set(β) ∩ set(γ ), using (bet5) we derive Σ ⊢ αi → αi ✶σ αi from which
we derive Σ ⊢ αi → β ✶σ γ by (bet2).
In the second case, we clearly have that conj(b) |HA β and conj(c) |HA γ , hence because of inference rule (bet2) it
suffices to show that Σ ⊢ conj(a)→ conj(b) ✶σ conj(c) can be derived. By definition, betσ (b,a, c) means that all com-
ponents correspond to orthogonal attribute domains. First assume that σ is a non-degenerate interval. We then have
that either (i) a= b, (ii) a= c, or (iii) that a differs only in one component from b and c, and that component in a is
moreover between the corresponding components in b and c. In the latter situation, Σ ⊢ conj(a)→ conj(b) ✶σ conj(c)
can clearly be derived using inference rules (bet1) (given (43)) and (bet7), whereas when a= b, it can be derived using
(bet4), and when a = c it can be derived using (bet4) and (bet3). Now assume that σ = [λ,λ] is a degenerate inter-
val. Then we have bet[λ,λ](bi,ai, ci) for every i, hence we can derive Σ ⊢ conj(a) → conj(b) ✶σ conj(c) by repeatedly
applying (bet1) and then using (bet8).
In the third case, note that set(β)↓ j and set(γ )↓ j correspond to formulas β∗ and γ ∗ such that β∗ |HA β and γ
∗ |HA γ .
Moreover, αi is of the form conj(a
↓ j)∧ x for some atom x, and in particular we have that αi |HA conj(a
↓ j). By induction,
we can moreover assume that Σ ⊢ conj(a↓ j)→ β∗ ✶σ γ
∗ can be derived. Using (bet2) this means that also Σ ⊢ αi →
β ✶σ γ can be derived. ✷
Proof of Proposition 10.
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α can be derived from the inference rules (bet1)–(bet6). We show by induction that then
betσ (set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(α).
If Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α was obtained from (bet1), then it is not hard to see from (40) that betσ (set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(α).
If Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α was obtained from (bet2), then there exist α
′ , β ′ , γ ′ and σ ′ such that α′ |HA α, β |HA β
′ , γ |HA γ
′ ,
σ ⊆ σ ′ and Σ ⊢ β ′ ✶σ ′ γ
′→ α′ . By induction, we then have that betσ ′(set(β
′), set(γ ′))⊆ set(α′), while set(α′)⊆ set(α),
set(β) ⊆ set(β ′) and set(γ ) ⊆ set(γ ′). By the fact that betσ is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion, it follows that
betσ (set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(α).
The case where Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α was obtained from (bet3) immediately follows from the definition of bet.
If Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α was obtained from (bet4), then there exist α1 , α2 , β1 and β2 such that α = α1∨α2 , β = β1∨β2 , and,
by induction, betσ (set(β1), set(γ )) ⊆ set(α1) and betσ (set(β2), set(γ )) ⊆ set(α2). We have that betσ (set(β), set(γ )) =
betσ (set(β1 ∨ β2), set(γ )) = betσ (set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ )). From the definition of betσ it easily follows that the latter
expression is equal to betσ (set(β1), set(γ ))∪ betσ (set(β2), set(γ )). By the assumption, this latter expression is known to
be included in set(α1)∨ set(α2), which is equal to set(α).
If Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α was obtained from (bet5), then there exist α1 , α2 , β1 , β2 , γ1 and γ2 such that α = α1 ∧ α2 , β =
β1∧β2 , γ = γ1∧γ2 and, by induction, betσ (set(β1), set(γ1))⊆ set(α1) and betσ (set(β2), set(γ2))⊆ set(α2). Now we have
that betσ (set(β1∧β2), set(γ1∧γ2))= betσ (set(β1)∩set(β2), set(γ1)∩set(γ2))⊆ betσ (set(β1), set(γ1))⊆ set(α1), using the
monotonicity of betσ w.r.t. set inclusion and using induction. For the same reason we also find betσ (set(β1∧β2), set(γ1∧
γ2))⊆ set(α2), which allows us to conclude that betσ (set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2))⊆ set(α1)∩ set(α2)= set(α1 ∧ α2).
The case where Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α was obtained from (bet6) is trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that betσ (set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(α) and show that Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α can be derived from the inference
rules (bet1)–(bet6).
First assume that β is inconsistent, then Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α can be derived using (bet6). If γ is inconsistent, then
Σ ⊢ β ✶σ γ → α can be derived using (bet3) and (bet6). If neither of β and γ is inconsistent (which implies that α
cannot be inconsistent either), given that (bet2) entails syntax-independence, we can assume without lack of generality
that α = α1∨· · ·∨αr , β = β1∨· · ·∨βs and γ = γ1∨· · ·∨γt , where each αi , βi and γi is a conjunction containing exactly
one atom from each attribute domain. In other words, set(αi)= {ai}, set(βi)= {bi} and set(γi)= {ci} are singletons. By
definition of betσ , we then have that betσ (set(β), set(γ ))=
⋃
i, j betσ (bi, cj). In particular, we also find that for every i
and j there are k1, . . . ,kl such that betσ (bi, cj)⊆ {ak1 , . . . ,akl }. The latter inclusion means that every component of each
of ak1 , . . . ,akl is between the corresponding components of bi and cj , and furthermore that there are no other such
vectors. Using (bet1) (given (44)) and (bet5) we can therefore derive that Σ ⊢ βi ✶ γ j → αk1 ∨ · · · ∨ αkl , and by (bet2)
that Σ ⊢ βi ✶ γ j → α. As we can derive this for every i and j, (bet4) finally allows us to derive Σ ⊢ β ✶ γ → α. ✷
Proof of Proposition 11.
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from the inference rules (par1)–(par12). We show by induction that
then set(δ)⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )).
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par1), then α, β , γ and δ are atoms and we have from (41) that
parτ (α, β,γ ; δ) holds, from which we find set(δ)⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )).
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par2), then there exist α
′ , β ′ , γ ′ , δ′ and τ ′ such that α′ |HA α,
β ′ |HA β , γ
′ |HA γ , δ |HA δ
′ , τ ′ ⊆ τ and Σ ⊢ δ′ → γ ′ ✄τ ′ 〈α
′, β ′〉. By induction, we then have that set(δ′) ⊆
parτ ′ (set(α
′), set(β ′), set(γ ′)), while set(α′) ⊆ set(α), set(β ′) ⊆ set(β), set(γ ′) ⊆ set(γ ), and set(δ) ⊆ set(δ′). By the fact
that parτ is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion, it follows that set(δ)⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )).
The case where Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par3) follows immediately from the definition of parτ , given
that the strong consistency of α implies that set(α) is realizable (by Lemma 1).
The case where Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par4) follows immediately from the fact that parτ (X1, X2,
X3)⊇ X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3 according to (29).
The cases where Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par5), (par6), (par7) and (par8) are entirely analogous.
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par9), then there exist α1 , α2 , β1 , β2 , γ1 , γ2 , δ1 and δ2 such that α =
α1 ∨ α2 , β = β1 ∨ β2 , γ = γ1 ∨ γ2 , δ = δ1 ∨ δ2 and, by induction, set(δ1)⊆ parτ (set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1)) and set(δ2)⊆
parτ (set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2)). We have
parτ
(
set(α), set(β), set(γ )
)
= parτ
(
set(α1)∪ set(α2), set(β1)∪ set(β2), set(γ1)∪ set(γ2)
)
From the monotonicity of parτ it easily follows that
parτ
(
set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1)
)
⊆ parτ
(
set(α1)∪ set(α2), set(β1)∪ set(β2), set(γ1)∪ set(γ2)
)
parτ
(
set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2)
)
⊆ parτ
(
set(α1)∪ set(α2), set(β1)∪ set(β2), set(γ1)∪ set(γ2)
)
Hence, we obtain set(α1) ∪ set(α2) ⊆ parτ (set(α1) ∪ set(α2), set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ1) ∪ set(γ2)) which is equivalent to
what we need to prove.
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par10), then there exist α
′ , β ′ and φ such that α = α′ ∧ φ and β =
β ′ ∧ φ and, by induction, set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α
′), set(β ′), set(γ )). Without lack of generality, we can assume that the
elements from domains(φ) are all orthogonal to each other (because φ was assumed to be strongly consistent), and that
φ = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φs is in disjunctive-normal form. Because of (par9), it is sufficient to show that set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α ∧
δi), set(β ∧ δi), set(γ )) for each i. Since these elements from domains(δ) are assumed to be orthogonal to the elements
of domains(α) ∪ domains(β) ∪ domains(γ ) ∪ domains(δ), however, the latter inclusion follows easily from the definition
of parτ , given that we already know that set(δ)⊆ parτ (set(α
′), set(β ′), set(γ )).
The case where (par11) is entirely analogous to the case for (par8) in the proof of Proposition 9.
The case where Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par12) is trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that set(δ)⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )) and show that Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from the
inference rules (par1)–(par12
). If either of α, β or γ is inconsistent, then we must have that set(δ) = ∅, i.e. that δ is
inconsistent as well. This means that Σ ⊢ δ → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from (par12) and (par2).
If α, β and γ are consistent, given that (par2) entails syntax-independence, we can assume without lack of generality
that δ is of the form δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δr , where each δi is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from each attribute
domain. In other words, set(δi) = {d} is a singleton. Because of inference rules (par9) and (par2
), it suffices to show
that Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived for each i.
The fact that d ∈ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )) either means that (i) d ∈ set(β)∪set(γ ), (ii) there is an a ∈ set(α), b ∈ set(β)
and c ∈ set(γ ) such that parτ (a,b, c;d) holds, (iii) it holds that d
↓ j ∈ parτ (set(α)
↓ j, set(β)↓ j, set(γ )↓ j) for some j,
where we write d↓ j for the vector d without the jth component and set(α)↓ j , set(β)↓ j and set(γ )↓ j are defined as
in (22), or (iv) it holds that d↓ j ∈ parτ (set(α)
↓ j, set(β)↓y, set(γ )↓y) for some j and some y from the corresponding
attribute domain.
In the first case, if moreover d ∈ set(β) ∩ set(γ ) ∩ set(α), we can derive Σ ⊢ δi → δi ✄τ 〈δi, δi〉 using (par4), and sub-
sequently also that Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 using (par2). If d ∈ (set(β) ∩ set(γ )) \ set(α), we know that α is strongly
consistent and 0 ∈ τ , which means that we can derive Σ ⊢ δi → δi✄τ 〈α, δi〉 using (par8) and thus Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉
using (par2). The case where d ∈ (set(α) ∩ set(γ )) \ set(β) is entirely analogous (using (par7) instead of (par8)). If
d ∈ set(β) \ (set(α) ∪ set(γ )), we know that α ∧ γ is strongly consistent and 1 ∈ τ , hence we can derive Σ ⊢ δi →
α ∧ γ ✄τ 〈α ∧ γ , δi〉 using (par3) and again Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 using (par2). If d ∈ set(γ )\ (set(α)∪ set(β)), we know
that either α and β are strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ or that α ∧ β is strongly consistent, hence we can either derive
Σ ⊢ δi → δi ✄τ 〈α, β〉 using (par6), or we can derive Σ ⊢ δi → δi ✄τ 〈α ∧ β,α ∧ β〉 using (par5). In both cases, we then
find Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 using (par2).
In the second case, we clearly have that conj(a) |HA α, conj(b) |HA β and conj(c) |HA γ , hence because of inference rule
(par
2
) it suffices to show that Σ ⊢ conj(d)→ conj(c)✄τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 can be derived. From the definition of parτ ,
we know that all components correspond to orthogonal attribute domains. Moreover, either
• a= c, b= d and 1 ∈ τ ,
• d= c and 0 ∈ τ ,
• a differs only in one component from b, c differs from d only in that same component, and the respective values
a j,b j, c j,d j of the component satisfy parτ (a j,b j, c j;d j),
• τ = [µ,µ] is a degenerate interval, and for each component j, it holds that parτ (a j,b j, c j;d j).
In the situation where a= c and b= d, we can derive Σ ⊢ conj(d)→ conj(c)✄τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 using (par3). In the
second situation, we can use (par6). In the third situation, it is clear that Σ ⊢ conj(d) → conj(c)✄τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉
can be derived by first applying inference rule (par1) (given (45)) and then applying inference rule (par10). In the last
situation, we can similarly derive Σ ⊢ conj(d)→ conj(c)✄τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 using (par11) instead of (par10).
In the third case, note that set(α)↓ j , set(β)↓ j and set(γ )↓ j correspond to formulas α∗ , β∗ and γ ∗ such that α∗ |HA α,
β∗ |HA β and γ
∗ |HA γ . Moreover, δi is of the form conj(d
↓ j) ∧ x for some atom x, and in particular we have that
δi |HA conj(d
↓ j). By induction, we can moreover assume that Σ ⊢ conj(d↓ j) → γ ∗ ✄τ 〈α
∗, β∗〉 can be derived. Using
(par2) this means that also Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived.
In the fourth case, we have that set(α)↓ j , set(β)↓ j and set(γ )↓ j correspond to formulas α∗ , β∗ and γ ∗ such that
α∗ |HA α, β
∗ ∧ y |HA β and γ
∗ ∧ y |HA γ . Using (par10) (for ψ = ⊤ and φ = y) and (par2), we again find that
Σ ⊢ δi → γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived. ✷
Proof of Proposition 12.
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ can be derived from the inference rules (par1)–(par9). We show by induction that
then
parτ
(
set(α), set(β), set(γ )
)
⊆ set(δ)
If Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ was obtained from (par1), then it is not hard to see from (42) that set(δ)= {d |parτ (a,b, c;d),a ∈
set(α),b ∈ set(β), c ∈ set(γ )}, from which we immediately find
parτ
(
set(α), set(β), set(γ )
)
⊆ set(δ)
If Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par2), then there exist α
′ , β ′ , γ ′ , δ′ and τ ′ such that α |HA
α′ , β |HA β
′ , γ |HA γ
′ , δ′ |HA δ and τ
′ ⊆ τ , and Σ ⊢ γ ′ ✄τ ′ 〈α
′, β ′〉 → δ′ . By induction, we then have that
parτ ′ (set(α
′), set(β ′), set(γ ′)) ⊆ set(δ′), while set(α) ⊆ set(α′), set(β) ⊆ set(β ′), set(γ ) ⊆ set(γ ′) and set(δ′) ⊆ set(δ). By
the fact that parτ is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion, it follows that parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(δ).
If Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ was obtained from (par3), then there exist α1 , α2 , δ1 and δ2 such that α = α1 ∨ α2 , δ = δ1 ∨ δ2
and, by induction, parτ (set(α1), set(β), set(γ )) ⊆ set(δ1) and parτ (set(α2), set(β), set(γ )) ⊆ set(δ2). Now, we have that
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ ))= parτ (set(α1)∪ set(α2), set(β), set(γ )). From the definition of parτ it easily follows that the
latter expression is equal to
parτ
(
set(α1), set(β), set(γ )
)
∪ parτ
(
set(α2), set(β), set(γ )
)
By the assumption, this latter expression is known to be included in set(δ1)∨ set(δ2), which is equal to set(δ).
The cases where Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ was obtained from (par4) or from (par5) are entirely analogous.
If Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par6), then there exist α1 , α2 , β1 , β2 , γ1 , γ2 , δ1 and δ2 such that
α = α1 ∧ α2 , β = β1 ∧ β2 , γ = γ1 ∧ γ2 , δ = δ1 ∧ δ2 and, by induction, parτ (set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1)) ⊆ set(δ1) and
parτ (set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2))⊆ set(δ2). Given the monotonicity of par w.r.t. set inclusion, we have that
parτ
(
set(α1 ∧ α2), set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2)
)
⊆ parτ
(
set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1)
)
⊆ set(δ1)
parτ
(
set(α1 ∧ α2), set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2)
)
⊆ parτ
(
set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2)
)
⊆ set(δ2)
which leads to parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ ))⊆ set(δ).
The cases where Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ was obtained from (par7), (par8) or (par9) are trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )) ⊆ set(δ) and show that Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉 → δ can be derived from
the inference rules (par1)–(par9). If α, β or γ is inconsistent, Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ can be inferred immediately using
(par7)–(par9) and (par2).
If neither of α, β and γ is inconsistent, given that (par2) entails syntax-independence, we can assume without lack
of generality that α = α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αr , β = β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βs , γ = γ1 ∨ · · · ∨ γt , δ = δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δu where each αi , βi , γi and δi
is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from each attribute domain. In other words, set(αi)= {ai}, set(βi)= {bi},
set(γi) = {ci} and set(δi) = {di} are singletons. By definition of parτ , we then have that parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ )) =⋃
i, j,l parτ (ai,bj, cl). In particular, we also find that for every i, j and l there are k1, . . . ,kr such that parτ (ai,bj, cl)⊆
{dk1 , . . . ,dkr }. The latter inclusion means that the respective components of ai , bj , cl on the one hand and dk1 , . . . ,dkr
on the other hand all define parallel directions, and in particular that we can derive Σ ⊢ γl ✄τ 〈αi, β j〉→ δk1 ∨ · · · ∨ δkr
using inference rules (par1) (considering that (46)) and (par6). As we can do this for all i, j and l, (par3), (par4) and
(par5) allow us to derive Σ ⊢ γ ✄τ 〈α, β〉→ δ. ✷
Proof of Proposition 13. Before we move to the actual proof, we introduce some notations. Recall that for any formula α,
set(α) was defined to be a subset of A. However, if domains(α)⊆ {B1, . . . , Bs}, then the attribute domains in {C1, . . . ,Ck} \
{B1, . . . , Bs} are redundant, as they are not constrained by α. Throughout the proof, we will use the notation setB(α) to
denote the restriction of the vectors in set(α) to the components corresponding to attribute domains from B, and similar for
the notation setC(α). For a vector x ∈A, we also write xB and xC for its restriction to the attribute domains in {B1, . . . , Bs}
and in {C1, . . . ,Ck} respectively. Moreover, it should be clear from the definition of e.g. betσ that when domains(β1) ⊆
{B1, . . . , Bs}, domains(β2)⊆ {B1, . . . , Bs}, and betσ (set(β1), set(β2)) then we also have betσ (setB(β1), setB(β2)), and similar
for betσ , parσ and parσ , and for situations where the attribute domains are restricted to {C1, . . . ,Ck}.
(⇒) Assuming
(R,Σ) ⊢ β → γ (A.4)
we show that f̂R(setB(β))⊆ setC(γ ) using structural induction. Note that the soundness part of the proposition follows
from this, as
setB
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
= X
setC
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
= Y
1. If the right-hand side of (A.4) has been obtained using (S), we have R |HA β → γ which means that fR(setB(β))⊆
setC(γ ) by definition of fR . Using Proposition 8, we can then conclude f̂R(setB(β))⊆ setC(γ ).
2. Assume that the last inference rule that was applied to obtain (A.4) was (I’). Then there are β1 , β2 , γ1 and
γ2 such that (R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1 , (R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2 , Σ ⊢ β → β1 ✶σ β2 and Σ ⊢ β1 ✶σ β2 → γ . By induc-
tion, we know that f̂R(setB(β1)) ⊆ setC(γ1) and f̂R(setB(β2)) ⊆ setC(γ2). By construction of f̂R , this means
that f̂R(betσ (setB(β1), setB(β2))) ⊆ betσ (setC(γ1), setC(γ2)). Moreover, by Propositions 9 and 10, we know from
Σ ⊢ β → β1 ✶σ β2 and Σ ⊢ β1 ✶σ β2 → γ that setB(β)⊆ betσ (setB(β1), setB(β2)) and betσ (setC(γ1), setC(γ2))⊆
setC(γ ). Together with the monotonicity of f̂R w.r.t. set inclusion, this leads to f̂R(setB(β))⊆ setC(γ ).
3. The case where (E’) is the last inference rule that was applied is entirely analogous.
4. Assume that the last inference rule that was applied to obtain (A.4) was (D). Then there are formulas β1, β2,γ1 ,
and γ2 such that
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1 (A.5)
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2 (A.6)
{β1 → γ1, β2 → γ2} |HA β → γ (A.7)
Without lack of generality, we can assume that domains(β1) and domains(β2) are subsets of {B1, . . . , Bs}, while
domains(γ1) and domains(γ2) are subsets of {C1, . . . ,Ck}.
Let x ∈ setB(β). First suppose that x ∈ setB(β1) and x /∈ setB(β2). By induction, we know that f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ1).
From (A.7), we moreover know that for every a in A such that aB = x and aC ∈ setC(γ1), it holds that aC ∈
setC(γ ). This means that fR(x) ∩ setC(γ1)⊆ setC(γ ). Together with f̂R(x)⊆ setC(γ1), this means in particular that
f̂R(x)⊆ setC(γ ).
Entirely analogously, we find f̂R(x)⊆ setC(γ ) when x /∈ setB(β1) and x ∈ setB(β2).
If x ∈ setB(β1) and x ∈ setB(β2), we find f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ1) ∩ setC(γ1). For every a in A such that aB = x, aC ∈
setC(γ1) and aC ∈ setC(γ2), it then holds that aC ∈ setC(γ ) due to (A.7). Again this leads to f̂R(x)⊆ setC(γ ).
Finally, if x /∈ setB(β1) and x /∈ setB(β2), we find that any a ∈A satisfying aB = x is such that aC ∈ setC(γ ). Thus
again we have f̂R(x)⊆ setC(γ ).
(⇐) We show by induction on n that whenever f̂R
(n)
(X)⊆ Y , it holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
(A.8)
The base case is straightforward: if fR(X)⊆ Y , then by construction of fR , it holds that
R |HA
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
and thus (A.8) by inference rule (S).
To show the induction step, because of inference rule (D), it suffices to show that for each x= (x1, . . . , xn) in X , it holds
that
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
(A.9)
From f̂R
(n+1)
({x})⊆ Y , by definition of f̂R
(n+1)
we have that there exist Y1, . . . , Ym , Z1, . . . , Zm , σ1, . . . ,σm , U1, . . . ,U l ,
V1, . . . , V l , W1, . . . ,W l and τ1, . . . ,τl such that
Y ⊇ fR
(
{x}
)
∩
⋂
i
betσi
(
f̂R
(n)
(Y i), f̂R
(n)
(Z i)
)
∩
⋂
i
parτi
(
f̂R
(n)
(U i), f̂R
(n)
(V i), f̂R
(n)
(W i)
)
(A.10)
and moreover x ∈ betσi (Y i, Z i) for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and x ∈ parτi (U i, V i,W i) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
By induction, we know that for each Y j , it holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
( ∨
(y1,...,ys)∈Y j
∧
i
yi
)
→
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ f̂
(n)
R (Y j)
∧
i
ai
)
and similar for Z j , U j , V j and W j . Furthermore, from x ∈ bet(Y i, Z i) we find using Proposition 9 that
Σ ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(y1,...,ys)∈Y j
∧
i
yi
)
✶σi
( ∨
(z1,...,zs)∈Z j
∧
i
zi
)
Similarly, from x ∈ par(U j, V j,W j), we find using Proposition 11 that
Σ ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(u1,...,us)∈U j
∧
i
ui
)
✄τi
〈( ∨
(v1,...,vs)∈V j
∧
i
v i
)
,
( ∨
(w1,...,ws)∈W j
∧
i
w i
)〉
Using Proposition 10 and 12, we trivially derive
Σ ⊢
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ f̂
(n)
R (Y j)
∧
ai
)
✶σi
( ∨
(b1,...,bk)∈ f̂
(n)
R (Z j)
∧
bi
)
→
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈betσ j ( f̂
(n)
R (Y j), f̂
(n)
R (Z j))
∧
i
ai
)
Σ ⊢
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ f̂
(n)
R (U j)
∧
ai
)
✄τ j
〈( ∨
(b1,...,bk)∈ f̂
(n)
R (V j)
∧
bi
)
,
( ∨
(c1,...,ck)∈ f̂
(n)
R (W j)
∧
ci
)〉
→
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈projτ j
( f̂
(n)
R (U j), f̂
(n)
R (V j), f̂
(n)
R (W j))
∧
i
ai
)
Using inference rules (I’) and (E’), together this allows us to derive
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈betσ j ( f̂
(n)
R (Y j), f̂
(n)
R (Z j))
∧
i
ai
)
(A.11)
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈parτ j
( f̂
(n)
R (U j), f̂
(n)
R (V j), f̂
(n)
R (W j))
∧
i
ai
)
(A.12)
Using inference rule (S), we find the trivial rule
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ fR ({x})
∧
i
ai (A.13)
By two repeated applications of (D) to combine (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), we find
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈betσ j ( f̂
(n)
R (Y j), f̂
(n)
R (Z j))
∧
i
ai
)
∧
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈parτ j
( f̂
(n)
R (U j), f̂
(n)
R (V j), f̂
(n)
R (W j))
∧
i
ai
)
∧
∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ fR ({x})
∧
i
ai
Finally, from (A.10), it follows that we can apply (D) one more time to weaken the latter rule, from which we obtain
(A.9). ✷
Proof of Proposition 14. The rule base R initially contains two types of rules. On the one hand, there is (84), whose
antecedent corresponds to the outcome J , while on the other hand, there are rules of the form (82) and (83), whose
antecedent does not correspond to any outcome at all. Clearly, non-trivial new rules can only be obtained from R by using
interpolative reasoning. More specifically, initially, we can only combine the rule (84) with one of the other rules to yield
a new rule r1 , whose consequent is of the form y1 ∨ y2 and whose antecedent only differs from the antecedent of (84) in
that an atom of the form xi has been replaced by xi , or an atom of the form xi has been replaced by xi . Moreover, this
application of interpolation can only be applied if the antecedents of both (84) and r1 satisfy the proposition p. Thus it is
clear that the antecedent of r1 corresponds to an outcome J1 such that there is an improving flip from J to J1 . We can then
combine r1 with some rule of the form (82) or (83) to obtain a new rule r2 whose antecedent corresponds to an outcome
J2 such that there is an improving flip from J1 to J2 . It is thus clear that a rule of the form (85) can only be derived if
there is a sequence of outcomes J , J1, . . . , Jm, I that corresponds to a sequence of improving flips, i.e. if I dominates J .
Conversely, it is also clear that if there is an improving flip from J i to J i+1 , we will be able to derive the corresponding
rule ri+1 once ri has been derived. ✷
Proof of Proposition 15. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Proposition 14. ✷
Proof of Proposition 16. By construction, it is clear that
f̂R
(i+1)(
{x}
)
⊆ f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
∩
⋂{
betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
))
| c1 ∨ c2
}
∩
⋂{
parτ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(β)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
))
| c3 ∨ c4
}
To show that the inclusion also holds in the other direction, let Y and Z be subsets of B such that x ∈ betσ (Y , Z). We show
that there are formulas α and γ such that condition c1 or c2 is satisfied and
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
∩ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
))
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
(A.14)
First assume that all attribute domains are orthogonal. If x ∈ Y and 0 ∈ σ , then we will have
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
, f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
and (A.14) is satisfied (regardless of the choice of α and γ ). Similarly, we find that (A.14) is satisfied if x ∈ Z and 1 ∈ σ . If
x ∈ Y ∩ Z , we find for any (non-empty) σ that
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
, f̂R
(i)(
{x}
))
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
and therefore again (A.14). If there are y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z such that betσ (y,x, z), then either we have y= x and 0 ∈ σ or y= z
and 1 ∈ σ or x= y= z, which are already covered, or we have that c1 or c2 is satisfied for α = conj(y) and γ = conj(z). In
the latter two cases we have
betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
))
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
and thus also (A.14).
Now assume that some attribute domains are not orthogonal, but that conj(x)= x j ∧ conj(x
′) with x′ ∈ betσ (Y
↓ j, Z↓ j). If
x′ ∈ Y ↓ j , 0 ∈ σ and the remaining attribute domains are orthogonal, we have
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
⊆ f̂R
(i)(
set
(
conj
(
x′
)))
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set
(
conj
(
x′
)))
, f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
⊆ betσ
(
f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
The case where x′ ∈ Z↓ j and 1 ∈ σ is entirely analogous. If the remaining attribute domains are orthogonal and there
are y′ ∈ Y ↓ j and z′ ∈ Z↓ j such that betσ (y
′,x′, z′), we can take α = conj(y′) and γ = conj(z′). The case where conj(x′) =
xl ∧ conj(x
′′) with x′′ ∈ betσ (Y
↓ j↓l, Z↓ j↓l) is handled by repeating the same argument.
In entirely the same way, we show that for subsets X , Y and Z of B such that x ∈ parτ (X, Y , Z), there exist conjunctions
α, β and γ such that c3 or c4 is satisfied and
f̂R
(i)(
{x}
)
∩ parτ
(
f̂R
(i)(
set(α)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(β)
)
, f̂R
(i)(
set(γ )
))
⊆ parτ
(
f̂R
(i)
(X), f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z)
)
which completes the proof. ✷
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